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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Antitrust-Post-Acquisition Evidence and
Conglomerate Mergers
In merger cases brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act,1
trial often does not take place until several years after the merger.
Because section 7 requires a predictive judgment as to the probability that a merger may substantially lessen competition, 2 there is
a temptation to test probabilities against the particular post-merger
history. A recent decision of the Supreme Court may be interpreted as indicating that post-merger evidence is not admissible.
This note will consider whether the Court has put forward a general
rule excluding post-acquisition evidence in light of the factual situation of that case and the methods used in reaching the finding of
illegality.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.3 the Court held that Procter
& Gamble's 1957 acquisition of the Clorox Company violated section
7. Procter & Gamble was the leading firm in the detergent field.
Clorox, with 49 percent of total liquid bleach sales, was the dominant firm in that industry, and together with its principal rival,
115 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), fornwrly 38 Stat. 631 (1914), provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226, 234-37, 247 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Bok], for a review of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver AntiMerger Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), which amended section 7. The technical additions and deletions are shown in Brown Shoe Company v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311 n.18 (1962).
2
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322-23, 332 (1962); United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 598 (1957); cf. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 308-09 (1949).
"58 F.T.C. 1203 (1961) (remand order), followed, [1961-1963 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 15,573 (1962) (summary of the FTC hearing
examiner's second report), aff'd as modified, [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP.
16,673 (FTC 1963), rev'd and vacated, 358 F.2d 74
(6th Cir. 1966), rev'd and affirming Commission, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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Purex, accounted for almost 65 per cent of national sales. Six
firms sold over 80 per cent of the nation's liquid bleach. The Court
found that "all liquid bleach is chemically identical," and attributed
Clorox's dominance to heavy advertising and promotional expenditures. Procter's acquisition of Clorox would probably injure competition because it eliminated Procter as a potential entrant and
"the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller,
but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive
structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading smaller firms from aggressively competing. . ..
The Court focused its attention upon three probable anticompetitive effects of the merger. First, the merger increased opportunities for anticompetitive behavior, such as predatory pricing.5
Second, the merger produced certain undesirable economies, chiefly
in advertising.' Third, the merger caused structural alterations,
through the elimination of a potential entrant into the concentrated
industry, that would probably lessen competition. Also, Procter's
7
merging into the industry had raised barriers to any further entry.
As pointed out in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan,
the majority did not give much consideration to the question of the
proper weight to accord post-acquisition evidence.8 This was in
many ways the main source of difference between the Commission
and the Sixth Circuit. The FTC hearing examiner had decided
that the merger violated section 7, but the full Commission had
found, at first consideration, that the record did not offer the Commission "an informed hindsight upon which it can act," but rather
allowed it to place "too much reliance upon treacherous conjecture." 9
Thus, the examiner was directed to consider post-acquisition developments. However, on second consideration, the Commission
stated that in this case post-acquisition evidence was irrelevant and
held the merger unlawful on the original record.'0 The court of
appeals reversed the Commission, holding that the record, and particularly the post-acquisition history, did not support the claimed
'386
386
'386
7 386

U.S. at 578.
U.S. at 575.
U.S. at 579.
U.S. at 580-81.
'386 U.S. at 591 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
'58 F.T.C. 1203, 1207 (1961).
16,673, at 21,587
Binder] TRADE REG. RE'.
10 [1963-1965 Transfer
(FTC 1963).
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probability of anticompetitive effects i" The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and largely adopted the Commission's
method of analysis. The Court, by its brusque treatment of the
point, seemed to hold that post-acquisition evidence is generally
irrelevant; in fact, the Commission's finding may have been determined by the nature of the post-acquisition evidence introduced
by Procter, and not by any position that all types of post-acquisition
evidence should be excluded.
Throughout the proceedings Procter argued that post-acquisition
developments should be considered to test the probabilities of anticompetitive effects.'
Since the merger was conglomerate, 3 it did
not have the effect of automatically foreclosing to competitors any
market outlet or source of supply as in a vertical merger.14 Nor
did it have the effect of automatically eliminating a competitor as
in a horizontal merger.' 5 Therefore, Procter argued, analysis of
the anticompetitive potentialities of the merger required a broader
scope of inquiry. The fact that the record failed to show any instances where the Commission's predictions had become reality
meant that these claimed probabilities were mere possibilities and
therefore too speculative to support a finding that the merger was
unlawful.' 6
1358
F.2d at 84.
12 386 U.S. at 591 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
1

Conglomerate mergers in their pure form involve the merger of com-

panies that are neither customers, suppliers, or competitors.

Pure con-

glomerate mergers are rare. As pointed out by Professor Turner, manage-

ment rarely enters a field in which they have no experience.

Turner,

Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv.

1313, 1315 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as Turner].

"The simple vertical merger is the acquisition of a firm that buys the
product sold by the acquirer, or sells a product bought by the acquirer. It
may lead to an extension of market power from one level to another, as
when a manufacturer obtains the main or primary source of a vital material.
Furthermore, it may impair competition by foreclosing markets to competitors5or to prospective entrants. Turner 1315, 1317.
" The simple horizontal merger involves acquisition of a firm producing
an identical product or a close substitute and selling it in the same geographic
market. Horizontal mergers eliminate competition that exists between two
firms, and further increase market concentration. Turner 1315, 1317.
Few mergers are clearly vertical or horizontal, but may include characteristics of both. For example, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370

U.S. 294 (1962), the merger was horizontal in some ways, vertical in
others. Brown Shoe was primarily a shoe manufacturer, but also retailed
some of its shoes. Kinney, the acquired firm, was primarily a retailer of
shoes, but manufactured some also. The Court treated the merger as
predominantly vertical.
" "Mere possibility" will not establish the statutory requirement that
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The Commission argued that section 7 clearly does not require
the existence of actual anticompetitive effects, but rather a conclusion as to the probability of various possible economic consequences of the merger. Except in the most obvious cases, economic
theory does not permit completely confident judgments even when
all possibly relevant facts have been assembled and considered.' 7
Therefore, the addition of inconclusive post-acquisition evidence
would serve no useful purpose but rather would tend to lengthen
and complicate the litigation. The post-merger history of ProcterClorox tended neither to confirm nor disprove the probability of
anticompetitive consequences because it was difficult to know to what
extent post-merger developments were caused by the merger, and
not by other factors. 8 Furthermore, dependence upon post-acquisition evidence offered by the respondent showing a paucity of actual
anticompetitive developments would allow controls to be evaded by
the dissimulation of market power during the period of observation." This policy consideration is similar to the rule against selfserving statements. 20 Thus, broadening the range of inquiry to
include factors incapable of clear resolution might inhibit rational
decision-making, 2 exhaust limited enforcement funds and curb the
effectiveness of the Commission.2 2
Commissioner Elman reasoned that consideration of five factors,
all present in Procter,might permit adjudication of the conglomerate
merger with as much facility as percentage ratios afford in the case
of a horizontal or vertical merger :23
the effect of the merger "may be" to lessen competition substantially. United
States
v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
(1957).
" [1963-1965
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.586, 598
16,673, at 21,573-74

(FTC 1963).
Is
IsId.
Id. at
at 21,587.
21,574. Cf. 386 U.S. at 592 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
20 See 6 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 1714, 1732; 2 Am. JUR.2d Administrative Law § 385 (1962).

[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,574
(FTC 1963); cf. Bok 246; Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. Rzv. 385 (1964); Stigler,
Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176 (1955).
22 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,574
(FTC 1963); cf. 386 U.S. at 592 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
"With 5 million U.S. companies in a 790 billion dollars annual economy,
that's a large order for any Federal agency-particularly one with only
1,150 employees and an annual budget of 14 million dollars." NEwswEEK,
Oct. 23, 1967, at 82.
20 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'.
16,673, at 21,580
(FTC 1963). Cf. Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictabilityin the
2"
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1. Is there a size disparity of the acquiring firm relative to the other
firms in the industry;
2. Is the market so concentrated as to make potential, rather than
actual, competition significant, and what is the position of the acquired firm within this market;
3. Does the merger involve the elimination of a significant potential
entrant;
4. What is the position of the acquiring firm in other industries;
5. What sorts of economies are enabled by the merger?
The Commission did not consider whether one or more of these
factors taken separately might be dispositive of the case. 24 Rather
the merger of Procter and Clorox was condemned because of the
probability of three anticompetitive consequences arising out of a
conjunction of all five factors. An analysis of these three consequences will necessarily involve discussion of evidentiary requirements and will highlight the commission's general approach to postacquisition evidence.
I. Increased Opportunity for Anticompetitive Behavior
Predatory pricing and its milder counterpart, disciplinary pricing,
were two manifestly anticompetitive practices made more possible
by the merger of Clorox and Procter.
Predatory behavior can be classified into three types: price warfare, promotional expenditure warfare, and use of Clorox as a
loss leader. All three types were considered distinct possibilities
by the Commission."
Because Procter would be able to cover its losses with funds
obtained from both other geographic bleach markets and the other
product markets in which it was active, such as detergent, it might
sell Clorox at a price lower than customary profit-maximizing considerations would dictate for the purpose of driving other competing bleach producers out of the market. Procter might achieve the
same effect by greatly increasing advertising and promotional expenditures and eliminate rivals by using expensive procedures beApplication of the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965); Address by
Chairman Dixon, 14th Annual Spring Meeting of the Section on Antitrust

Law, American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C., April 14, 1966, 5
TRADE REG. REP. 50,142 (1966).
"4[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. " 16,673, at 21,581
(FTC 1963).
2"Id. at 21,579. See 386 U.S. at 576.
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yond their financial means. 26 Or Procter might use Clorox as a
loss-leader, in order to yield off-setting profits on other Procter
products, such as detergent. Clorox might be sold at prices below
out-of-pocket costs for the purpose of increasing sales of complimentary products. Though not done with the intent to destroy
27
rivals, this practice might have the same effect.
Disciplinary pricing, or short-term predation done with the
intent of preventing competing bleach producers from challenging
Clorox's dominance, was a further possibility in Procter. Moreover,
the possibility that Procter would resort to disciplinary pricing or
out-right predation was interpreted by the Commission as a possible psychological restriction upon competition in the liquid bleach
28
industry.
There is some controversy among commentators as to whether
the mere possibility of predatory or disciplinary behavior should be
a negative factor in merger litigation.2 9 It is argued that clear-cut
examples of such behavior are largely lacking, and that furthermore,
if such behavior were effective it would violate other antitrust statutes. For example, predatory pricing as an "attempt to monopolize"
is a clear violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,8" and predatory
pricing in one of several geographic markets violates the RobinsonPatman Act."' Loss-leader underpricing might be attacked as an
"unfair method of competition" or an "unfair act or practice" under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 Nevertheless, the
Court apparently held that the increased possibilities of such behavior were negative factors in finding against the merger.

" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,564
(FTC 1963).
22 Id. at 21,578-79.
See Turner 1346-49.
28 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE. REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,579
(FTC 1963). See 386 U.S. at 579, n.3.
DE.g., Turner 1346. Professor Turner argues that the possibility of
predatory disciplinary behavior "seems so improbable a consequence of
conglomerate acquisitions that it deserves little weight in formulating antimerger rules based on prospective effects." However, the possibility of
such behavior has played a major part in some merger cases. See, e.g.,
309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Arrow Foil case); 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.
Mo. 1964) (Cupples case).
8115 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). See American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946). See generally, Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1956).
81 15 U.S.C. § 13a
(1964). Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
12 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964). Cf. FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co. 352 U.S. 419
(1957).
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Post-acquisition evidence demonstrating that the respondent
had engaged in such anticompetitive behavior could be held by the
enforcement agency to be decisive against the merger.8 3 Yet, the
failure of such a practice, largely within the respondent's control,
to materialize would not be, under Procter, significant. In the
former, the evidence would be relevant; whereas, in the later it
would be irrelevant due to the obvious possibility that the respondent "held back."
II. Undesirable Potential Economies
Both the Court and the Commission recognized that Clorox
would enjoy substantial competitive advantages over other liquid
bleach producers because of the use of Procter's substantial advertising discounts.2 4 In fact one of the reports by Procter's promotion
department emphasized that Procter would be able to make more
effective use of Clorox's advertising budget due to the large discounts given Procter, as a major advertiser, by television networks
and magazines.
Commissioner Elman argued that such potential economies were
undesirable.3 6 Because all liquid bleaches were chemically identical,
such advertising was merely persuasive rather than informational.
Clorox, already the most heavily advertised bleach, was the most
expensive.17 As he saw it, price competition beneficial to the consumer had given way to brand competition beneficial only to the
seller. Cost advantages enabling still more extensive advertising
" See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).

There, Consolidated had attempted with some success, to follow a policy of
reciprocal buying, or reciprocity. Simple "reciprocity" is a threatened
withdrawal of orders if the products of an affiliate cease being bought, or
a conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for the products
of that affiliate. However, "reciprocity" was not a factor in Procter.
"'386 U.S. at 580; [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16,673, at 21,576-77 (FTC 1963).
16,673, at 21,577
" [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(FTC 1963). These discounts were very substantial. For example, for
the same expenditure Clorox could, by using the Procter discount, obtain
33 per cent more network television advertising, and it would be of a
superior type.
:'These advertising economies could be classified as false economies because they stemmed from sheer size, rather than greater efficiency. See
Turner 1323-26.
"'[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,585-86
(FTC 1963).
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could, therefore, only impair price competition further, to the detri38

ment of the consumer.
To the extent that Procter had used its advertising discounts
to buy advertising for Clorox, it was the utilization of undesirable
economies. The failure of Procter fully to realize these savings was
of little significance, for obviously it could do so.3 9 Evidence showing that despite full utilization of discounts there had been no obvious change in competition might be relevant, though such an approach would necessarily involve the objection that the Commission
simply was not equipped to enter into the sort of wide economic investigation that the evaluation of such an occurrence would entail.
On the other hand, evidence that such competitive advantages
available to Clorox caused competitors to merge might be admissible
because it would involve a much narrower investigation. However,
such an approach would not favor the respondent, but would instead
be used by the government to show the decisive nature of such
potential economies.4" At this point it may seem that the government always wins when post-acquisition evidence is involved. But,
if this be true to any extent, it is only because the evidence is relevant or manageable when offered by the government, but irrelevant
or unmanageable when offered by the respondent.
III. Structural Alterations

Conglomerate mergers do not obviously change the actual competitive structure of a given market because at least on the face of
things they involve merely one company stepping into the place of
another company which is neither a competitor, supplier or customer
of the acquirer. However, certain subtle changes in the competitive
relationships may be significant.
Two primary considerations in Procter were the loss of a potential entrant and the raising of substantial entry barriers.
Procter, at the time of the merger, was a successful, experienced
" Id. One is reminded of cosmetic-manufacturer Charles Revlon's comment upon criticism of large advertising expenditures because they increased

the price of the item: "We sell hope."
[1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REF. 16,673, at 21,587.
The criticism of advertising, in the Commission's opinion particularly,
has led to speculation that it might indicate the start of direct government
regulation of such marketing practices. See Bork, The Supreme Court and
CorporateEfficiency, FORTUNE, Aug. 1967, at 92. Quaere if such regulation
might be possible under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
note 32 supra.
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firm in the household products field. It was familiar with the production and marketing of a complimentary line of products and had
a history of internal expansion into related fields such as the abrasive
cleanser industry.4 1 Procter was one of a very few companies
powerful enough to challenge Clorox's dominant position with some
hope of success. Procter had considered independent entry into
the liquid bleach industry prior to its acquisition of Clorox.4 2 From
these facts the Commission concluded that Procter was a uniquely
qualified potential entrant. The liquid bleach industry was highly
concentrated. Actual competition, while not entirely absent, was
not vigorous. Under such circumstances potential competition from
a likely entrant might serve the same function that actual competition served in other more competitive markets. For example, the
Commission considered it likely that firms within the liquid bleach
industry had curbed the trend towards high oligopoly profits in
order to make entry as unattractive as possible. Therefore, Procter's merging into the industry by acquiring its potentially greatest
competitor, Clorox, eliminated "one of the last factors tending to
preserve a modicum of competitive pricing and business policies in
the liquid bleach industry. .. .
Clorox, at the time of the merger, enjoyed certain competitive
advantages that could discourage outside entrants: product differentiation and a reserve of accumulated consumer preference; some
financial reserves; and considerable pricing flexibility. Though
such factors had not deterred Procter's successful penetration of
the abrasive cleanser market, such factors, supplemented by Procter's
financial size and aggressive marketing techniques, tended to make
entry barriers, in the appraisal of possible entrants, very high. Furthermore, expansion into new regional markets contemplated by
existing bleach producers other than Clorox might be deterred.
High entry barriers, made even higher by the Procter-Clorox merger, decreased the possibility of new entrants, and correspondingly
diminished any residual potential competition effects."
Evidence of post-acquisition entry, conceivably by firms such
" In 1957 Procter introduced "Comet" cleanser and within 20 months
obtained 36.5 per cent of the national market, though faced with substantial
competition from established cleanser manufacturers, such as Purex (Bab0). [1963-65 Transfer Binder] T.ADE REG. REP. 16,673, at 21,564 (FTC
1963).
12 Id.at 21,564-65.
'Id. at 21,584.
"Id. See Turner 1358.
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as Colgate or Lever Brothers, into the liquid bleach industry might
be relevant insofar as it would tend to disprove the argument that
Procter was one of a very few potential entrants whose entry resuilted not only in a significant diminution of potential competition,
but raised entry barriers.45 However, there are at least two possible
objections to the use of such a post-acquisition entry as a means to
refute probabilities. First, entry by a large firm does not necessarily
imply that entry by smaller firms has not been effectively foreclosed
by the merger. Second, the transformation of a predominantly
small-firm industry into one dominated by large firms may be undesirable in light of Congressional concern for the preservation
of allegedly beneficial small-firm competition.4 6 Such post-acquisition evidence would be unlikely to succeed as a refutation of the
government's arguments, and because of its negative implications
might further harm the respondent's case.
There are two other possible structural alterations discussed by
the Commission. Though they bear upon the issue of potential
competition, they are more directly used to interpret post-acquisition developments. These two alterations are "triggered mergers"
and possible broader definition of the relevant product market.
The Commission considered it likely that Procter's merger into
the market might "trigger" defensive mergers among the smaller
firms in the liquid bleach market. Such triggered mergers might
be prompted by a desire to achieve greater competitive equality with
Clorox, or to protect market shares in the face of a much more
powerful competitor. The Court concluded that second-ranked
Purex's merger with fourth-ranked Fleecy White was such a triggered merger.4 7 This merger, it was argued, was the result of "the
lesson of Erie," where Purex's attempt to enter a market dominated
by Clorox brought on a price and promotional war. The result of
this competitive warfare was that Purex withdrew from the market,
and Clorox's market share increased.48
'rBut cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
"Accord, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273 (1966) ;
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 & n.43 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320, 344 (1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand,
J.); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588, 592
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
17 386 U.S. at 578.
'8386 U.S. at 579 n.3.
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Furthermore, Commissioner Elman stated that certain postacquisition developments may require the consideration of their
effects upon potential competition within a given product market.40
For example, the post-merger development of a related item may
itself influence competition within a given market. This situation
was presented in the Commission's later decision against the acquisition of the S.O.S. Company by General Foods. 50 The fact situation was very similar to Procter,5 ' but there were several major
differences. For one thing, General Foods had not been in any
meaningful way a potential entrant into the steel wool soap pad
industry.52 Furthermore, following the merger several large firms
outside the steel wool industry had introduced plastic scouring pads.
These were in some ways acceptable substitutes for steel wool soap
pads. In the cleaning of Teflon-coated cookware they were directly
competing, and in fact displacing, steel wool soap pads from a growing part of the market. The majority of the Commission defined
the relevant market as the steel wool soap pad market. Commissioner Elman, dissenting, argued that the majority should have at
least taken into account the influences that these post-acquisition
developments probably would have on the real and potential competitive forces within the steel wool soap pad industry 3 Thus, postacquisition evidence in this context may be significant and may be
entertained by the Commission.
IV. Conclusion
Three general observations concerning the admissibility of postacquisition may be helpful.
First, to the extent that specific anticompetitive consequences
within the control of the respondent have not materialized, this
failure to act will not be significant. The enforcement tribunal
would probably resist any attempt by the respondent to introduce
such post-acquisition evidence on the ground that it was self-serving
' [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,673 at 21,584 (FTC
1963).
" General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,465 (FTC 1966).
"I1d. at 22,732-42. Here the majority set forth an eleven page "Com-

parison of Operative Facts in the General Foods and Procter & Gamble
Cases."
" Id. at 22,746 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman).
"Id. at 22,748-49 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Elman).
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and might have been manufactured by the holding back of market
power during the period of observation.
Second, if such anticompetitive consequences have become apparent, the government is almost certain to use them against the
54
legality of the merger.
Third, the enforcement tribunal is unlikely to consider evidence
showing that there has been no overall change in the market. Such
evidence would be open to the objection that its evaluation would
require that type of general economic investigation of all possibly
relevant factors that the Commission wanted to avoid. The Commission would argue that such a broad survey would not be likely
to be of any benefit, even if it were possible.55
The attitudes of the Federal Trade Commission are significant
because they probably are largely shared by the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department. Both agencies have been successful in
persuading the Supreme Court to adopt their arguments. 56 In Procter, the majority of the Court apparently approved of the Commission's handling of the case. 57 Thus the attitudes of the Commission are probably those of the majority of the Court.
In light of the Court's earlier decision in the duPont-General
Motors case, 58 the Government's attitude towards post-acquisition
evidence as set forth in Procter may become very significant. In
duPont, the purchase of 23 per cent of General Motors stock was
successfully attacked thirty years after the acquisition. The Court
held that a merger may be attacked "whenever the reasonable like' This "double-standard" is criticized in Day, Conglomerate Mergers and
"The Curse of Bigness", 42 N.C.L. REv. 511, 557 (1964); Reilly, Conglomerate Mergers-An Argument for Action, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 522, 536 (1966);
Solomon, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137, 140-41 (1967).
" Cf. Cook, Merger Law and Big Business: A Look Ahead, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 710, 713 (1965); Phillips, Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Antimerger Decisions, 21 Sw. L.J. 429, 440-41 (1967); Rill, The Trend
Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 54 GEO.
L.J. 891, 901 (1966).
'0See, Note, 45 N.C.L. Ray. 1015, 1019 n.27 (1967).
" One Commissioner has stated that the Court "is in full agreement with
the Commission's approach to section 7 enforcement against conglomerate
acquisitions." Address by Commissioner John R. Reilly, Antitrust Section

of the Ohio State Bar Association, in Dayton, May 12, 1967, 5 TRADE REG.
REP. 50,170, at 55,229 (1967). See also, J. ScoTT & E. ROCKE ELLER,

AND TRADE REGULATION TODAY: 1967, 116 (1967).
" United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
See Bromley, Business' View of the duPont-General Motors Decision, 46
GEo. L.J. 646, 653-54 (1958).
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lihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint. .

...

"

The willingness of enforcement tribunals to consider not only probable anticompetitive consequences, but also their actual manifestation
becomes significant when the respondent is denied in many instances from using the absence of such consequences to refute the
Government's arguments.
However, the respondent may be able to use certain types of
post-acquisition evidence, especially of developments arising beyond
its control and going to the core of the government's analysis of
potential competition.6" Two examples-post-merger entry and the
development of a related product that tends to broaden the relevant
market-have already been mentioned. Furthermore, it should be
clear from the discussion that relevant economic data gathered
after the merger and not at all related to a respondent's post-acquisition behavior or probable anti-competitive effects generally should
not be excluded merely because the studies, made after the merger,
technically make such data "post-acquisition evidence." For example,
a respondent will probably not make studies of relevant market or
product class until after the merger when suit is brought; the admissibility of such evidence clearly should not be questioned.
More immediately, post-acquisition evidence will be decisive in
the treble-damages action filed by Purex Corporation against Procter & Gamble."' Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for treble" 353 U.S. at 592.
See Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 16,673, at 21,574 (FTC 1963):
Specifically, we think that the admission of post-acquisition data
is proper only in the unusual case in which the structure of the market
has changed radically since the merger-for example, where the
market share of the merged firm has dwindled to insignificanceor in the perhaps still more unusual case in which the adverse effects
of the merger on competition have already become manifest in the
behavior of the firms in the market.
For an example of disastrous mergers, compare Dresser Industries, Inc.,
[1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,513 (FTC 1963), with
Fruehauf Trailer Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,260
(FTC 1965). However, neither of these involves the conglomerate situation. Observe that while future developments may cause the reopening of
a case, they will not cause the Commission to modify a decree. Compare
National Tea Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463
(FTC 1966), with Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (divestiture order),
56 F.T.C. 1680 (1960) (petition to reopen denied), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
6 Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 24, 1967, at 38, col.2. The suit, filed in
federal district court in Los Angeles, asks 174.5 million dollars in damages,
Purex, at the time of the merger of Clorox and Procter, had total sales of
50 million dollars, but this includes sales of a variety of household products
60
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damages to "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Purex's complaint alleges that Procter-Clorox "engaged and con62
tinued to engage in severe and sustained predatory price cutting."
Implicit within Purex's claim for relief is the requirement that there
be actual post-merger injury. However, neither the Court nor the
Commission found that Procter had actually engaged in any definite
anticompetitive behavior. Had there been any such behavior it
seems highly unlikely that the Commission would have failed to
use it against the merger, if only because an analysis based upon the
actual manifestation of predatory pricing would have been far
simpler. Therefore, it will be interesting to see to what extent, if
any, the Commission might have considerably simplified their task
by the use of such evidence.
K. G. ROBINsON, JR.

Attorney and Client-Compensation of Indigent's Counsel in
Federal Post-Conviction Proceedings
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently held that counsel appointed to defend an indigent defendant in the courts of North
Carolina cannot be compensated by the state for work done in the
federal courts to vacate the state conviction. 1 The attorneys reand not just liquid bleach. Observe that section 5(b) of the Clayton Act

suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of

government proceedings and for one year thereafter.
02 Id.

State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 153 S.E.2d 749 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 828 (1967).

The attorneys were appointed in Mecklenburg County

Superior Court in 1959 to defend Elmer Davis, Jr. who was charged with
rape and murder under ch. 112 (1949) N.C. SESs. L. (required counsel
for indigents charged with a capital offense). The conviction was appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed, State v. Davis, 253
N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960).

After a petition for rehearing was denied,

the attorneys won a stay of execution and sought certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 365 U.S.
855 (1961).

Attorneys then petitioned the federal district court for a

writ of habeas corpus which was denied, Davis v. North Carolina, 196 F.
Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961). On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Davis' confession was obtained within the bounds of due process, Davis v.
North Carolina, 310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962). The district court again
refused to grant the writ, Davis v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.
N.C. 1963) and the court of appeals upheld the lower court in a 3-2 decision,
Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966),
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ceived 1,700 dollars from Mecklenburg County for the work done in
the courts of North Carolina2 and sought an additional 1,758.72
dollars for expenses and 30,000 dollars as the reasonable value of
their services in the federal courts.' The lower court ordered the
state to pay the attorneys 8,000 dollars pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-5 (1965).' The court stated that failure to compensate these
attorneys would be a denial of due process and equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and
would deprive the attorneys of their "rights" under the Constitution
of North Carolina.5
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower court. It held that section 15-5 did not apply to
the facts presented and it was error to allow compensation in this
case.6 "The power to provide compensation for lawyers representing
7
indigent defendants rests with the Legislature and not the courts."
It appears that the Supreme Court of North Carolina is the only
appellate court to have passed on the question of whether a state
should pay a lawyer who represents an indigent state prisoner in
reversed and remanded the case to the district court. Davis was subsequently
and the state elected not retry him.
ordered released from custody
2 State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 2, 153 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1967) ; this payment
was subsequent to ch. 247 [1917] N.C. SEss. L. as amended by ch. 226
[1937] N.C. SEss. L., allowing the fee of appointed counsel in capital cases
to be determined by the judge and paid by the county where the defendant
was indicted.
3270 N.C. at 4, 153 S.E.2d at 751.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1965) states in part: "Whenever an attorney
is appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant he shall receive
a fee for performing such service to be fixed by the court which shall be
reasonable and commensurate with the time consumed, the nature of the
case, the amount of fees usually charged for such cases in the county or
locality. ..

."

State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 13, 153 S.E.2d 749, 757 (1967). Neither the
judge below nor the attorneys' brief stated any specific provision of the
North Carolina Constitution which would be violated by the state's refusal
to pay compensation: "[A] person who asserts that a particular act violates
his rights under the Constitution must point out the particular provision of
the Constitution that he claims is violated." Id.
aId. at 9, 153 S.E.2d at 755. If N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-5 (1965) is read
alone it would appear broad enough to cover the circumstances in the instant
case, but when read in conjunction with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1965)
its coverage does appear limited to compensation for state proceedings only.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 states in part: "When a defendant charged with
a felony is not represented by counsel. . . . If the judge finds that the
defendant is indigent . . . he shall appoint counsel for the defendant . . ..
In case of an appeal to the supreme court the judge shall appoint counsel
for such appeal or continue the services of the counsel already appointed
" 270 N.C. at 10, 153 S.E.2d at 755.

1968i

COMPENSATION OF COUNSEL

subsequent proceedings in the federal courts."

On the question of

services rendered within the same judicial system, the weight of
authority in this country and England adheres to the general principle that only the legislature can provide for the compensation of
an indigent's court appointed lawyer.
Two theories have been
offered in support of this principle, either singly or in conjunction.
First, a lawyer is an officer of the court and as such has special
rights and privileges, a corollary to which is the duty, when called
upon by the court, to defend indigent criminal defendants. One
who accepts the office of attorney does so cum onere, with all the
burdens incident thereto."
Second, the obligation to defend indigents without compensation is a condition under which a law yer is
licensed by the state to practice law." The courts have used this
reasoning to reject the claims of attorneys that refusal to compensate them for their work was an unconstitutional deprivation of

property.
A minority of courts has rejected the idea that only the legislature can provide for the payment of court appointed counsel.' 2
Those courts claiming the power to grant compensation despite the
lack of legislative authority have given various reasons: (1) the
8270 N.C. at 13, 153 S.E.2d at 757. The circumstances presented by
this case probably constitute the only way that the question of compensation
of counsel could occur in North Carolina today. North Carolina provides
for mandatory appointment of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1965), and requires that such counsel
be compensated, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965).
' Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Dillon, In re Strayer, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966); Weiner v.
Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143 (1966); Warner v.
Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966); In re Mears, 124 Vt. 131, 198
A.2d 27 (1964) ; Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943) ;
All these cases concerned compensation for services rendered in the same
judicial system which denied the compensation.
0Cases cited note 9 supra.
Cases cited note 9 supra.

v. United States, It re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore.
1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966) ;
People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d. 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) (the
court stated that it had the power to relieve an intolerable burden on assigned
counsel but the permanent solution was for the legislature) ; Knox County
Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940);
Hyatt v. Hamilton County, 121 Iowa 292, 96 N.W. 885 (1903); State v.
Rush, 46 N.T. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (the court delayed its plan until
January 1, 1967 to give the legislature time to act on the matter) ; County of
Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861). But see Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 425 (1902). All these cases concerned services rendered to the same judicial system which granted the compensation.
SDillon

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

court's power to grant compensation for a public taking of private
property;13 (2) the theory of implied contract;4 and (3) authority
incidental to the power of the court to appoint attorneys for indigents.1 5 In allowing the compensation, these courts have rejected
the idea that lawyers are a privileged class and that the defense of
indigents can be made a condition to the state's grant of a license
to practice law.' 6
While it is true that almost all states' 7 and the federal government' provide some method of compensating assigned counsel for
trial and appellate work, the area of post-conviction proceedings has
been almost ignored.' 9 Today an attorney, appointed to represent
an indigent defendant, who decides to seek relief in the federal
courts2 ° from a state or federal conviction, will probably not receive compensation from any source.
The federal courts have held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel does not apply in a post-conviction proceeding.2 ' The
reason often given is that such proceedings are civil rather than
criminal. 2 However, a failure to appoint counsel may be reversible
1" Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Ore.
1964), rev'd 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
"'Haytt v. Hamilton County, 121 Iowa 292, 96 N.W. 885 (1903) ; (the
state, by requesting and accepting the services of appointed counsel, implies
a promise to pay the reasonable value thereof).
"Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29
N.E.2d 405 (1940); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966).
1" Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Ore.
1964); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29
N.E.2d 405 (1940). In Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133
P.2d 325, 327 (1943), the court rejected the idea that defense of indigents
could be made a condition to the granting of a license by the state to practice
law but allowed compensation on the "officer of the court" theory.
1 See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 253-67 (1966)
for a summary of the various state statutes relating to appointment and compensation
of counsel for indigent defendants as of March 1, 1965.
"The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).

" AmERICAN

BAR Ass'N,

STANDARDS

RELATING

TO POST-CONVICTION

REMEDIES: TENTATIVE DRAFT 65 (1967) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS].
20 'Federal post-conviction proceedings' for the purpose of this note mean
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958) (brought by one who seeks
relief in the federal court from a state court conviction), and under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1958) (brought to vacate a federal conviction).
2 Whether or not this rule should be changed is beyond the scope of
this note. For discussions of this rule see: 51 CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963);
30 U.
2 2 Cir. L. REv. 583 (1963); and 19 U. MIAmI L. REv. 432 (1965).
E.g., Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1964) (appointment of counsel is within the discretion of the trial court) ; Huizar v.
United States, 339 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1965).
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error if the circumstances of the particular case show that such
failure resulted in a denial of due process as required by the fifth
amendment. 3 If a substantial issue of fact is alleged in the petition
which would require a hearing in the case of a non-indigent defen24
dant, counsel should be appointed.
The procedure of appointing counsel to represent an indigent
petitioner for post-conviction relief only after the court has determined that the petition is not frivolous has received some criticism,2 5 but it does have merit. The classification of the relief as
civil rather than criminal is not the real reason for the refusal to
appoint counsel as a matter of right.2" Sounder reasons for the
practice are as follows: (1) these proceedings follow criminal proceedings where the petitioner has had benefit of counsel at every
step; (2) such proceedings are not part of the guilt determining
process, but follow it; and (3) petitions may be resubmitted and
27
are often frivolous.
Once the court determines that a petition does have merit and
decides to appoint counsel, he should be compensated.2" The burden
confronting counsel assigned for post-conviction proceedings is
often greater than that faced by counsel assigned at the trial level.29
When a hearing is granted, "it must be a fair one considering all
the circumstances, adequate. . . to allow a meaningful presentation
" Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
" Id.; Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1965); Campbell v.
United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963) (a divided court held that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), required appointment of counsel);
Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958); Green v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass. 1958)
" PRESIDENT'S Comm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUsTIcE, TASK FORcE REPORT: THE CouRTs 47 (1967).

This report

recommended the appointment of counsel for petitioners as a matter of
course. See also articles cited note 21 supra.
"' Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States ex reL Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
"'Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962).
"A.B.A. STANDARDS § 4.4(a) (1967): "It is most desirable to avoid
processing of applications for post-conviction relief beyond the initial
screening of the documents without counsel ....

are appointed.
public
funds."
2

When private counsel

their services should be compensated adequately from

REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 45 (1963)
[hereinafter
cited as COMMITTEE ON POVERTY]. Some examples of these are: (1) if

there is a factual issue witnesses must be located and their memories may be
poor; (2) often counsel must work from a "cold" record; (3) legal issues
are often complex and require much research; (4) the proceedings can be
protracted (five years in the instant case) ; and many others.
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of the petitioner's claims." 3 Whether failure to compensate attorneys for the work they do when appointed to represent an indigent
results in constitutionally inadequate advocacy has yet to be answered. While some data on this question has been collected, it is
insufficient to allow an affirmative answer."1 It is difficult if not
impossible to determine what motivates an attorney to exhaust
every means of relief for his indigent client.8 2 However, when
assigned counsel has received less than adequate compensation for
his work at trial and on appeal,88 the financial burden of federal
post-conviction relief may be too great.8 4 Such a situation presents
a serious ethical problem to the lawyer who fears that the diligent
prosecution of his client's rights may seriously affect his earning
capacity.
The Bar alone should not be required to carry the burden of the
costs of post-conviction proceedings. The infrequency of appointment where it is discretionary may in some ways be attributed to the
reluctance of the court, state or federal, to impose the financial burden of such proceeding on the bar.85 If due process requires counsel to be appointed for the indigent petitioner in the federal court, 30
the duty to provide counsel should be that of the federal government and not the legal profession. The fifth amendment guarantee
of just compensation was designed to prevent the government from
87
placing a public burden on a single person or group of persons.
When a fair hearing requires representation of the petitioner, coun3o

1d.

31

SILVERSTEIN,

supra note 17 at 20-27. In one study, defendants with

assigned counsel pleaded guilty more often and received prison sentences
rather than probation more often than defendants with retained counsel.
. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 408, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (1966).
The compensation allowed by the various statutes is often nominal.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) provides a
maximum of 15 dollars per hour for work in court and 10 dollars per
hour for work outside of court, not to exceed 500 dollars for a felony
or 300 dollars for a misdemeanor, with a proviso for payment in excess of
this limit in extraordinary circumstances. Compensation for appeal work
"in no event" is to exceed 500 dollars for a felony and 300 dollars for a misdemeanor. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-1 (1966) provides for a maximum of
50 dollars for a felony and 25 dollars for a misdemeanor.
34 Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Ore.
1964) (two young attorneys were forced to borrow money to support themselves when a case they were assigned lasted almost six months).
33
A.B.A. STANDARDS 65: United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins,
281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960).
8

Cases cited supra note 24.

* Dillon v. United States, In re Strayer, 230 F. Supp. 487, 493 (D. Ore.
1964).
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sel should be appointed: "Counsel. . . should be permitted to make
as effective a presentation as the merits allow. This requires that
counsel be granted reasonable compensation and. . . expenses properly incurred." 8
While the majority of jurisdictions place the responsibility of
providing for compensation of appointed counsel on the legislature,"9 in federal post-conviction proceedings the issue is complicated
by the question of which legislature-state or federal. Compensation of counsel for petitioners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 from federal convictions must be the responsibility of the
federal government. One of the most delicate problems in the
dual system of government is the power of the federal courts to
grant relief to state prisoners by vacating state court convictions.
The issue of compensation of counsel for state prisoners seeking
federal relief merely compounds the problem.
A state could enact a statute which authorized the payment of
attorneys for work done in the federal courts to vacate the convictions of indigent state prisoners, although this appears highly unlikely. States dislike the use of habeas corpus by the federal courts
to vacate state court convictions. Since the state court has no jurisdiction to appoint counsel for a federal court proceeding, the state
legislatures would be reluctant to appropriate money without any
control over its disbursement.4 0
It would seem that the best solution is a federal statute that
provides compensation for attorneys appointed in the federal court
to represent indigent petitioners proceeding under either 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (state prisoners) or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (federal prisoners).
Whether the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, is
sufficient for this purpose has not yet been decided.41 The statute
COMMITTEE ON PovERTY 45.
supra.270 N.C. 1, 8, 153 S.E.2d 749, 754 (1967). The
,0See
Statenote
v. 9Davis,
attorneys in this case were never appointed by any court to represent Davis
in the federal courts.
"'InIn re Hagler, 246 F. Supp. 716 (D. Hawaii 1965), the court held
that compensation could not be paid to counsel appointed to seek post-conviction relief under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. However, the court
treated the action before it as equivalent to a motion pursuant to Rules 12
and 48 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and granted the
counsel compensation; In United States v. Boyden, 248 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.
Cal. 1965) the court allowed compensation under the Criminal Act of
1964 to counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a probation
revocation proceeding, saying that the hearing was an extension of the
criminal proceeding.
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says that "A defendant... shall be represented at every stage of the
proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States
The Attorney General of the
commissioner through appeal." 4
United States said that the statute was "designed to afford representation to each defendant throughout his involvement in the judicial process." 4 But the committee which was established to implement the statute stated that the act was not meant to apply to postconviction proceedings. 44 Since there is a strong possibility that the
courts will refuse to grant compensation to counsel appointed for
post-conviction purposes under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
Congress should pass legislation specifically addressed to the problem.
Providing counsel for a prisoner attacking the validity of a
state conviction in the federal courts creates a delicate situation."
It is just this situation which strongly supports the present practice of not appointing counsel in such proceedings as a matter of
course. It would be most offensive to the states if counsel were
automatically appointed to examine the record for constitutional
defects whenever a petition was filed. Such appointment is not
required" to establish the equality in the administration of criminal
justice which the Supreme Court has sought.47 The proposed statute should set up guidelines that counsel not be appointed if the petition is frivolous or if there has been a prior unsuccessful application
where the prisoner was represented by counsel. 48
When appointed counsel's duty to his client terminates with the
final judgment of the court appointing him, there is a gap in representation.49 The statute could remedy this by establishing a procedure whereby a preliminary motion filed with the petition would
'"The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c).
' 3 Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, United States Attorney General, to
President John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEws 2994-95 (1964).

ADMIN.

"'REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OF 1964, 36 F.R.D. 277, 287 (1965)
"COMMITTEE ON POVERTY 45.

AcT

"See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
T

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 707, (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"A.B.A. STANDARDS 67.
9Id.
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allow the court to continue the appointment if it determined counsel
was required.50
STEPHEN E. CULBRETHr

Constitutional Law-Effect of the Right to Speedy
Trial on Nolle Prosequi
In Klopfer v. North Carolina,'theUnited States Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to speedy
trial is a basic right protected by the Constitution and is therefore
incorporated into the due process clause and made obligatory upon
the states under the fourteenth amendment.2 Implicit in the decision is the proposition that the speedy trial guarantee is to be enforced against the states according to the federal standard.3
In Klopfer, a violation of the sixth amendment was found in
the use of the North Carolina procedural device of "nolle prosequi
with leave." Its objectionable characteristic is the power given
the state solicitor to suspend indefinitely action on a case, after an
indictment has been filed, and notwithstanding defendant's timely
demand for trial.
Klopfer, a Duke University professor, was tried in March, 1964
on charges of criminal trespass resulting from his participation in
a widespread effort to desegregate stores and eating places in Chapel
Hill in January of that year.' A mistrial was declared when the
jury could not agree and the case was continued. Prior to the next
oId. It is hoped that this would reduce the number of claims for relief
and all but eliminate the frivolous ones. Counsel should advise the prisoner
of the risks inherent in filing the petition: it endangers eligibility for parole
and if successful the relief is usually limited to a new trial and the danger of
a higher sentence.
2

87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).

E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right
to confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment
privilege against self incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel). These decisions, like the
instant case, are part of a continuing pattern which is apparently directed
towards complete imposition of at least the guarantees of the first eight
amendments upon the states by declaring them to be a part of the fourteenth
amendment. For a discussion of how, if at all, this operation should come
about, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"To be enforced against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the same standards that protect these personal rights against
federal encroachment." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
'See Pollitt, Legal Problens in Southern Desegregation: The Chapel
Hill Story, 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1965).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

session of criminal court, Klopfer was informed by the solicitor
that a nolle prosequi would be requested. Klopfer objected on the
basis that the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court,5 had abated the trespass prosecution. The
solicitor thereupon moved for, and was granted, a further continuance. The matter came to a head on August 9, 1965, when the case
was considered in response to a motion filed by Klopfer when he
discovered that his case was not docketed for the August term. At
the hearing on that motion, the solicitor was granted a nol. pros.
with leave. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, 6 and
further appeal to the United States Supreme Court resulted in unanimous reversal.
The holding in Klopfer renders the federal speedy trial standard binding on the states but fails to explain just what that standard is. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a general
authorization for the courts to dismiss an indictment if there is unnecessary delay in bringing the case to trial.7 The facts and circumstances of each case are to be considered in determining whether
there has been an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to speedy
trial.8 These facts are to be viewed in light of three purposes of
the guarantee: (1) to prevent undue incarceration prior to trial;
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern attendant upon public accusation; and (3) to limit the possibility that delay will impair the ability
of the accused to defend himself.'
Decisions of the lower federal courts help to clarify the basic
speedy trial guidelines. Consideration must be given to the potential as well as the actual prejudice which may result from long
delays.' 0 Lower federal courts cite with approval many state decisions to the effect that prejudice in fact is not required to be
shown by the defendant." Additionally, the federal decisions appear
to place the basic burden of justification for delay upon the govern5
1n Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) the Supreme
Court held that pending trespass prosecutions for acts which were declared
legal by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were abated by the act, even though
the trespass occurred prior to its passage.
' State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909 (1966).
'FED. R. CRIm. P. 48(b).
'Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
' United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
"0United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
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ment, rather than the accused. In Hedgepeth v. United States'
there is a statement that, whereas time is only one factor to consider, it is nevertheless the most important factor, and the longer the
delay the heavier the burden on the government in arguing that the
right has not been abridged."3 Other factors to be given weight
are the diligence of the prosecution, the defense, and the court. 14
Finally, federal authorities agree that the speedy trial guarantee
may be waived, and that a presumption of waiver or acquiescence
arises when no demand for trial is made. 15
In spite of the broadness of the federal speedy trial standard,
it appears that compliance with the fourteenth amendment requirement of "fundamental fairness"'" calls for a close re-examination
of the old and respected device of nol. pros. in North Carolina.'1
In both nol. pros. and nol. pros. with leave, the permission of the
court is theoretically required before a case may be restored to the
trial docket, and in both actions the defendant loses no freedom of
movement.' 8 In nol. pros. with leave, however, the general permission of the court to reinstate the indictment is given at the time
nol. pros. with leave is granted. This leaves the date of the trial,
if there is to be one, completely in the control of the solicitor. In
view of the Supreme Court's holding in Klopfer that the right to
speedy trial affords affirmative protection against unjustified delay,
it is difficult to see how the procedure of nol. pros. with leave can
be further tolerated. The solicitor cannot justify in advance a
delay of undetermined length. In the case of simple nol. pros., the
court must grant permission at the time of reinstatement. In this
context, keeping in mind the federal standard requirement of the
present decision, the question arises as to whether or not the North
364 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
18Id.
at 687.
1 I1d.
' United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198 (D.Md. 1955).
See also
Amnot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 306 (1958).
"6Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
'Nolle prosequi is not authorized by statute, but has evidently been
carried over from English common law, where its use can be traced back

to the time of Charles II. Goddard v. Smith, 87 Eng. Rep. 1008, 1009 (Q.B.
1705). For a detailed explanation of the employment of nolle prosequi in
North Carolina and a warning that the state decision in Klopfer could be
an abuse, see Note, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 1126 (1966).
" The state does not restrict travel, but one who is under indictment may
be denied a passport by the Secretary of State, and thus forbidden to leave
the country. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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Carolina courts would refuse permission to reinstate, based solely
on a failure by the solicitor to justify the delay. To date, except
for Klopfer, it appears that no speedy trial standard, federal or
state, has seriously impaired the solicitor's use of mol. pros. and
nol. pros. with leave.
The North Carolina Supreme Court is quite clear about appointing inferior courts at all levels as watchdogs to guard against abuses
of nol. pros.;19 but apparently it has not departed from the criterion
that "the discharge of the prisoner without delay is the true test of
the termination of the action so that it matters not whether it is
terminated by nol pros.

. .

and nol pros with leave."20

The fol-

lowing sentiments appear to be more in keeping with the Klopfer
decision: "The belief that all judges will take care to see that no
unfairness is allowed to take place disregards the fact that the loss
of the right to speedy trial is in itself unfair."'"
Prior to the present decision, the speedy trial standard in North
Carolina appears to have involved judicial consideration of four
factors: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3)
resultant prejudice to the defendant, and (4) any waiver of the
guarantee by the defendant.2 2 In addition, it is strongly indicated
that the guarantee does not apply to persons released on bail, 8 and
that the burden rests upon the person asserting denial of a speedy
trial to show that the delay was due to willfulness or neglect on the
part of the state.24 A demand for trial is apparently also a requisite
in order to avoid waiver of the guarantee.2"
A comparison with the federal speedy trial standard outlined
above shows that too much weight is being given in North Carolina
to the freedom of the defendant as a balm to soothe the ills of delay. Likewise, the state appears not to be in line with the federal
standard as to where the basic burden lies when the issue of speedy
trial arises. The federal proposition that the delay must not be
purposeful or oppressive2 6 is not to be narrowly construed; the delay
does not have to be deliberate to violate the sixth amendment and its
"oState v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 40 S.E. 1 (1901); State v. Thornton,
35 N.C.
256, 258 (1852); State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 614 (1825).
2
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
21 Note, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 325, 329 (1960).
22

State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).

23

Id. at 543, 139 S.E.2d at 876.

State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 52, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965).
at 53, 145 S.E.2d at 315.
" Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).

24

2 1Id.
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very length may place a heavy burden of justification upon the
prosecution.
Otherwise, so long as the anxiety attendant to public accusation
is given proper weight, the factors considered by the North Carolina
courts appear adequate for the determination of whether the speedy
trial guarantee has been abridged, according to the federal standard.
The requirements of the fourteenth amendment, then, would apparently be met if judges put teeth into the device of nol. pros. by
seriously evaluating, in light of the federal standard, each request
by a solicitor to reinstate an indictment. There appears to be
no way of squaring nol. pros. with leave with the fourteenth amendment and the use of this device should be abandoned.
It can be fairly concluded that Klopfer requires only a new
attitude in employment of simple nol. pros. But difficulties may
be avoided, and time and money saved if some method of safeguarding the right to speedy trial is employed other than dismissal of
indictments by the courts upon determination that the federal standard has not been met. The precise requirements of the guarantee
are sure to remain subject to interpretation, and therefore to
litigation. It would serve the ends of efficiency as well as justice if
the state were to go beyond the bare minimum requirement as it
stands today and enact a statute which places a definite and reasonable limitation upon the state whereby an accused person must
either be brought to trial or the indictment dismissed.
Many states have such statutes. The details vary but the most
common limitations provide for dismissal if the defendant is not
brought to trial within sixty days after the filing of the indictment
or information, 7 or within the present or next succeeding term
of court,2 8 or a combination of the two."9 All of the statutes provide that they are not operative if the delay is at defendant's request
and many are not absolute in that they operate only in the event
good cause it not shown for delay past the statutory period3 0 It
is suggested that North Carolina draft a statute which provides that:
2
' ARIz. RULES CRIMI. PROC. 236 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382 (1954);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.495 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.46.010 (1961).
"8GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1953) ; IDAHO CODE tit. 19, § 3501 (1948) ;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1964); N.D. REV. CODE § 29-1801
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 812 (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-1
(1953).
" IOWA CODE § 795.2 (1962).
"0The statutes of Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada and Oklahoma
contain this provision,
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(1) defendant must be brought to trial within the same term of
court in which the indictment is filed, or within the next succeeding
term of a court competent to try him, and (2) unless good cause is
shown by the state for failure to bring defendant to trial within
this period, this statute shall operate as a bar to future prosecution
for offenses arising out of facts alleged in the indictment. This
'
proposed statute would not operate as a "sword for the defendant, 31
for the General Assembly is able to draft initially, and subsequently
revise as necessary, the time limitations to reflect the current ability
of the state's courts, acting with reasonable diligence, to bring persons to trial. That period at any given time might be longer than
two terms of court. At any rate, Klopfer makes clear that an outer
limit of some type, however determined, is necessary.
So much for the law. In reality, Klopfer has not yet had his
trial. He attempted to have the case removed to federal court under
procedures recently outlined by the United States Supreme Court for
cases arising out of civil rights disputes.82 But the federal district
court declined to take jurisdiction on November 17, 1967, stating
that the state court should be given another chance to dismiss the
indictment.
WILLIAM S. GEImER
Constitutional Law-Defamation under the First AmendmentThe Actual Malice Test and "Public Figures"
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivai' the United States Supreme
Court held that "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" 2 was such that in certain cases libelous misstatements
of fact were qualifiedly protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. In granting this constitutional protection to misstatements
of fact,8 the Court held that the protection was for critics of the
" State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).
" Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966).
'New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2Id. at 270.
'The Court expressly adopted the minority view. 376 U.S. at 280 & 281.
See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Ponder
v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358

(1944).
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official conduct of public officials 4 but that it did not extend to a
libelous statement made with "actual malice-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."" Failure to show that plaintiff was a public official or proof
of actual malice destroyed the protection.
Much discussion and debate followed the New York Times
decision concerning how far the constitutional protection was to
be extended.6 In response to this uncertainty, the Court granted
certiorari in two cases to decide whether the first amendment protects "public figures" as well as public officials and if so, when the
protection was to be lost.7

Case No. 150, Associated Press v.

Walker was a libel action arising out of newspaper accounts concerning the integration riots of September 30, 1962, at the University of Mississippi.' Case No. 37, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
arose out of an article published in the Saturday Evening Post9
which falsely accused the athletic director of the University of
Georgia of having conspired to "fix" a college football game.'
In deciding these two cases all members of the Court agreed that
the first amendment qualifiedly protects libelous misstatements of
fact made about "public figures" as well as those concerning public
officials. 1 There was disagreement, however, over the test to be
employed in determining the proof necessary to destroy the constitutional protection. 2 Five members of the Court applied the "actual
malice" test of New York Times and reversed Walker because there
'376 U.S. at 283.
r376
U.S. at 279.
'Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York
Times Rule, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 215 (1966); Comment, New York
Times v. Sullivan: The Public Official and The Public Figure, 30
L. REV.316 (1966); Note, 42 U. WASH. L. REv. 654 (1967).
SCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

Id.at 140.

o SATURDAY EVENING POST,

10388

U.S. at 135.

ALBANY

March 23, 1963, at 80.

"1388 U.S. at 131-33 (syllabus).

In thus extending the constitutional

protection to "public figures," however, the Court failed to give a concrete
standard for determining when a person was a "public figure." This interesting point is beyond the scope and purpose of this note. For discussion
of who constitutes a public official see, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); Note, 46 BOSTON U. L. REV. 568 (1966); Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q.

419 (1967); Note, 39

TEMp.

L.Q. 510 (1966).

" The first two parts of the opinion of Chief justice Warren constituted
the only majority opinion by the Court. 388 U.S. at 164. The four justices
who concurred in this part of his opinion disagreed with the last half of
the opinion, two of them dissenting on grounds other than the question of
reckless disregard. 388 U.S. at 172.
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was no proof of actual malice. 13 In Butts, however, two of these
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show the degree of
reckless disregard necessary to defeat the constitutional protection
while the remaining three thought it was sufficient. 4 The remaining
four members of the Court voted to reverse Walker and to affirm
Butts 5 arguing, however, that "the rigorous federal requirements
of New York Times are not the only appropriate accommodation
of the conflicting interests at stake."' 0 Instead they felt that the
public figure should be able to recover on "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers.' 7 The conflict in these opinions raises
the question of whether the proof required to defeat the constitutional protection is to be less rigorous where public figures rather
than public officials are involved.
The actual malice test as promulgated in New York Times is
a two part test. The first half of the test, actual knowledge of the
It is in determining
falsity of a statement, is easily applied.'
of
the statement that
truth
or
falsity
of
the
reckless disregard
problems arise. From the very nature of the test it can be seen
that a determination of reckless disregard will involve many factors.'" Cases which present the question, however, frequently involve wide publication of a statement, the falsity of which could
have been discovered prior to publication by a more thorough investigation."0 Thus the effect of the degree of investigation upon the
determination of reckless disregard may often be important. To
analyze this test under New York Times and Butts it is necessary
to look at the specific factors the courts have found relevant.
In New York Times, the defendant newspaper published a
paid advertisement which supported the civil rights movement in
" 388 U.S. at 164.

1 388 U.S. at 170-71.
15 388 U.S. at 133.

"6388 U.S. at 155.
17388 U.S. at 155.
" Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 221 A.2d 181 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
935 (1966).
"oIt is clear that many factors have an effect upon the amount of investigation required. Some of these factors are: (1) The time lag between the
occurrence of an alleged fact and its publication (is it "hot" news?); (2)
The degree to which the publication is clearly defamatory; (3) Notice of
probable falsity of the statement.
"°E.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Alabama. Several false statements were made about the activities
of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department which plaintiff,
the head of the department, claimed defamed him by innuendo. The
Court held that the failure of defendant to investigate the validity
of the statements before publication was "constitutionally insufficient" to show reckless disregard.21 A clearer example of what
the Court required for proof of reckless disregard in the case of
public officials is found in Garrisonv. Louisiana.2" There the District Attorney of Orleans Parrish, Louisiana, was convicted under
a Louisiana criminal libel statute for falsely accusing eight local
judges of misconduct in office and dereliction of duty. The Supreme Court held, in striking down the statute as unconstitutional,
that the trial court's finding that the statements were made with
personal malice and without reasonable grounds to believe them
true23 was not sufficient to show reckless disregard because even
where personal malice is present, defeasance of the protection can
not be based on unreasonableness or mere negligence.2 4 Thus, it
seems that the reckless disregard test, as applied to public officials
in these two cases, is a stringent test, almost the equivalent of requiring culpable knowledge.25
Although Garrison is the only post-New York Times decision
by the Supreme Court that gives a further definitive showing of
what would constitute reckless disregard in libel actions, several
other courts have interpreted the standard, often in terms of investigation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in applying
the test stated: "While verification of the facts remains an important reporting standard, a reporter, without a 'high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity,' may rely on statements made
by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the
story without fear of libel prosecution by public official."2 6 Where
a reporter for defendant newspaper wrote a story falsely accusing
plaintiff, a justice of the peace, and his daughter of trying cases
without jurisdiction, the fact that the reporter failed to make a
21 376

U.S. at 265.

'
22

379
64 (1964).244 La. 787, 154 So. 2d 400 (1963).
StateU.S.
v. Garrison,

2

379 U.S. at 79.

2 At least one state court has interpreted it this way, stating that
"[R]eckless disregard must be the equivalent of the 'calculated falsehood'
.... " Pauling v. National Review, 49 Misc. 2d 975, 981, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 19
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
" New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).
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single check of the court records for verification was held insufficient
to show reckless disregard of the truth.17 By contrast, where defendant magazine published an article which was based on the
Civil Rights Commission Report and which stated that plaintiff
was brutal towards Negroes when in fact the report only alleged
this, the court held there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
on the question of reckless disregard.2 The fact that the story was
based on a written report from which information was inaccurately
reported strongly suggests the existence of actual knowledge. A
much clearer case of reckless disregard is found in Thompson v. St.
Amant 9 There the defendant, a candidate for public office, made
a speech in which he accused a deputy sheriff, along with others, of
taking bribes. Recovery was allowed on proof that defendant did
not know plaintiff personally but based his clearly defamatory
statement on the sole affidavit of a man of questionable reliability.
The defamatory article in Butts was based upon the affidavit
of an insurance salesman who testified that an electrical error
allowed him to overhear a telephone conversation in which Butts
revealed the plays and plans of the Georgia team to an opposing
coach. In determining that the evidence in Butts was constitutionally sufficient to show reckless disregard of the truth under New
York Times, the Chief Justice alluded to the fact that "little investigative effort was expended initially, and no additional inquiries
were made even after the editors were notified by respondent and
his daughter that the account to be published was absolutely untrue."8 0 But is it reasonable to require a publisher to investigate
every time he is notified that a story to be printed is untrue? In the
New York Times case, the plaintiff notified the Times that the statements in the advertisement were false and demanded a retraction.
The Court held that "The Times' failure to retract . . . is . . .

not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes." 81 In
addition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted New
York Times to allow reporters to rely on a single source, exactly
what the Saturday Evening Post did.32 In his opinion the Chief
"Ross v. News-Journal Co., -Del.-,

228 A.2d 531 (1967).

" Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 909 (1966).
29250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967).
388 U.S. at 169-70.
376 U.S. at 286.
"New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Justice alluded to the fact that the Saturday Evening Post had
decided to embark on "a program of 'sophisticated muckraking'
• . . ),33 and that it had published the article "with full knowledge
of the harm that [was] . . . likely .

.

. [to] result

. .

."'

It

should be remembered that in Garrison the defendant made his
defamatory accusations in anger with the purpose of revenge, and
even though they were made without reasonable grounds to believe
them true, these facts were held not to constitute reckless disregard.3 5 By comparing the amount of investigation held to be adequate in New York Times and Garrison with the amount held to
be insufficient to avoid a finding of reckless disregard in Butts, it
is reasonable to conclude that the test of reckless disregard applied
to public figures in Butts is less rigorous than the one applied to
public officials. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that two
members of the majority that extended the New York Times standard were of the opinion that the evidence in Butts was not constitutionally sufficient to show actual malice8 6 In addition, four
members of the Court felt that a different and less rigorous test
37
should be applied to public figures.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court applied a less rigorous
standard of actual malice in Butts than that applied to public
officials. By applying a different standard the Court may be doing
what Mr. Justice Black describes as "getting itself in the same
quagmire in the field of libel in which it is now helplessly struggling
in the field of obscenity.13 It would not be unreasonably burdensome to have different standards of proof for public figures and
public officials if these standards were clearly set forth by the
Court. The first amendment does not necessarily require that a
man who is well known because of his personal qualities be exposed
to the same amount of uncompensated libel as the man who holds
a public office, simply for the sake of having one legal standard.
Whether the first amendment requires this equal exposure at all
must be clarified by the Court in a future decision.
By failing to hold the public figure in Butts to the same standards of proof required from public officials, the Court left many
Il 388
388
379
388

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at

169.
170.
79.
170-71.

388 U.S. at 155.
81388 U.S. at 171.

11
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questions unanswered, not the least of which is whether this standard will apply uniformly to all public figures. It should be noted that
Butts, while a public figure in one sense, had not "thrust himself
into the vortex" of public controversy. Contrasted to this, General
Walker had voluntarily involved himself in a public controversy
by going to the University of Mississippi and speaking to the rioters.
In a great majority of the cases decided prior to Butts in which
the courts were willing to extend the New York Times rule to public
figures, these public figures had voluntarily involved themselves in
major public issues. Thus where a Nobel prize winning professor
had publicly advocated the cessation of nuclear testing, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals by dictum held him subject to the actual
malice rule. 9 On the other hand courts have been unwilling to
extend the constitutional protection where the plaintiff was not
involved in important public issues. °
It is purely subjective speculation to state that the Court intends
the reckless disregard test to be different for different types of
public figures. Yet the fact that such speculation can be rationally
made is strong evidence of the confusing nature of this decision.
In any event it is reasonable to conclude that the Court failed to
adhere to the reasoning of the Chief Justice that "differentiation
between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy,"4 1 because the Court in Butts ostensibly
did apply a different standard of proof than that applied to public
officials.
JAMEs R. CARPENTER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Extension to the
High School Disciplinary Proceeding
In Madera v. Board of Education,' the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York held the due process clause
"Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966) (dictum); accord, Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 368 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1966).
" Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1964); accord, Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
" 388 U.S. at 163.
'267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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of the fourteenth amendment applicable to a high school suspension
hearing. The plaintiff, a 14 year old pupil, was suspended from
his school. The incident which precipitated his suspension was not
stated in the opinion. His parents were notified that a "guidance
conference" would be held regarding the suspension. An attorney
was obtained by the parents but was advised that attorneys are not
permitted to attend the conference under General Circular No. 16
of the New York City School Board.2 The court found it had
jurisdiction to enjoin the use of this provision under 42 U.S.C.
Section 19833 and issued an injunction primarily because of the
drastic consequences which could result from this apparently innocent, child-oriented guidance conference. Any one of the following could happen to Victor Madera: (1) loss of his personal liberty
by being involuntarily incarcerated by the district superintendent of
schools ;4 (2) temporary expulsion; (3) permanent expulsion; (4)
his being sent to a special day school for socially maladjusted pupils.5 Moreover, his parents might have an action brought against
them in a child neglect proceeding.' With particular reference to
these grave consequences the court specifically held that "enforcement by defendants of the 'no attorneys provision' of Circular No.
16 deprives plaintiffs of their right to a hearing in a state initiated
proceeding which puts in jeopardy the minor plaintiff's liberty and
right to attend public schools." 7
Madera limits its discussion to the right to counsel issue. PerCircular No. 16 (1965-66) of the New York City School
Board provides: "Inasmuch as this is a guidance conference for the purpose
of providing an opportunity for parents, teachers, counselors, supervisors,
et al., to plan educationally for the benefit of the child, attorneys seeking to
represent the parent or child may not participate." 267 F. Supp. at 358.
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides: "Every person who, under color of
any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage... subjects... any
citizen. .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable for redress to the party
injured... at law... in equity, or other proper proceeding. . ."
'The defendant school authorities under N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3214 (McKinney 1953), can confine a pupil in any private school, orphan's home, or
similar institution or with other private agencies provided they have the
written consent of the parents. If the parents refuse to "consent" in writing,
they "shall" be proceeded against for violating their statutory duty to see
to the pupil's attendance at school. N.Y. EDuc. LAW, §§ 3205, 3212, 3214
(McKinney 1953) (emphasis added); See also, N.Y. FAmLY CT. ACT, §§
312, 332, 335, 337 (McKinney 1963).
'267 F. Supp. at 366-69.
N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT, §§ 312, 332, 335, 337 (McKinney 1963).
'267 F. Supp. at 369.
2 General
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haps courts in future high school disciplinary cases will be confronted with other procedural due process rights in situations which
involve involuntary incarceration or permanent withdrawal of the
right to attend a public school. The fundamental fairness of the high
school disciplinary proceeding will be in issue. Since there is little
authority in this area, these courts, confronted with the problem
of what procedural standards should apply to meet the fairness test,
may look outside the high school hearing to other disciplinary proceedings that involve similar situations and consequences. If the
consequence of the proceeding involves incarceration, the courts
may turn to the juvenile proceeding for procedural guidelines. If
the only consequence of the high school hearing is permanent expulsion, the court may find relevant those procedural safeguards
granted to college students.
The law relating to college expulsions within the last decade
found itself in transition as it mirrored the changing character of
academic freedom 8 National attention recently focused on college
student disciplinary proceedings arising from political expressions
through peace demonstrations9 and academic expressions through
'A partial bibliography of materials treating due process and college
student disciplinary proceedings follows: T. E. BLACxWELL, COLLEGE LAW
(1961); Blackwell, Can a Student Be Expelled Without Due Process?,
COLLEGE AND UNIv. BUSINESS 31 (1961); Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law, 34 J. HIGHER EDUC. 250 (1963); Seavy,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van
Alstyne, ProceduralDue Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. RaV. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. IN
TANS. Q. 1 (1965); Comment, ProceduralLimitations on the Expulsion of
College and University Students, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 542 (1966); Note,
The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962
ILL. L.F. 438; Note, Judicial Review-Procedural Due Process in Student
Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 N.C.L. REV. 152 (1965); Note, Expulsion of
College and Professional Students-Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW 174 (1963); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958); 55 Am. JuR. Universities and Colleges § 22 (1946); 14 C.J.S. Colleges and Universities § 26
(1939). The following concern the changing character of academic freedom:
Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?, COLLEGE AND UNIV.
BUSINESS 466 (1964); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. IN
TRANS. Q. 1 (1965); NATIONAL STUDENT AsSOcIATION, CODIFICATION or
POLICY (1961); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSIIFS

(1961),

reprinted in 48 AM. Ass'N UNIV. PROFESSORS BULL. 110 (1962).
0Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967). This case
held "that the student plaintiffs had no constitutional, statutory, or contractual
right to a notice of charges and a hearing before they could be expelled ......
Id. at 614. The holding was based upon Howard University being a private
rather than a public institution. The fourteenth amendment appears to apply
only to state financed universities, but as due process expands so does the
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editorials. 0 In the early cases the main issue was whether the university had complied with its side of the bargain with the student
as manifested through its catalogue and bulletins. This issue was
usually decided in favor of the university because its rules and
charter showed it had committed itself to very little. 1 Numerous
rationales were given for denying due process to students."2 The
area of state action. See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ.,
203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962); Abernathy, Expansion of the State
Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375
(1958); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083
(1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961).
As college level education is being recognized as a fundamental interest and
as private universities use more public subsidies, these private universities
will be circumvented by more constitutional restraints. Van Alstyne, Provedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
368, 388 (1963) ; see also, Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of
Law?, 30 GEO. WASHa. L. REV. 399, 413-16 (1962).
" Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 2593-N (M.D. Ala.
Sept. 8, 1967). This court ruled that a state-supported college may not
promulgate "unreasonable rules and regulations" that restrict academic or

political expression by students.
" See Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom, 2 L. in TRANS. Q. 1,

8 n.24 (1965), for numerous cases on this point.
" A classic statement of the rationale for denying due process is that
found in the college catalogue which the student contracts to follow upon

admittance. The Syracuse University catalogue of 1928 was a typical exam-

ple of this. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.
Supp. 435, 438 (1928); Annot. 58 A.L.R.2d 903, 913 (1958). For a modern
example of this see Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.
1967), where the Howard University catalogue explained the relation between the University and its students as follows: "Attendance at Howard
University is a privilege. In order to protect its standards of scholarship
and character, the University reserves the right, and the student concedes
to the University the right, to deny admission to and to require the withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to the
University. .

. ... Id.

at 613.

Another rationale is the in loco parentis

argument which justifies summary discipline because the university is dealing
with "legal infants," whose collective welfare has to be safeguarded from

contamination by undesirable elements.

Van Alstyne, Procedural Due

Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 368, 376 (1963).
How can this rationale be valid when almost all entering students are at
least eighteen which is legal adulthood for many purposes, and the average
age, including graduate students, is above twenty-two? U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, SERIES P-20, 110 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (July 24, 1961). Another rationale stresses
that only the wealthiest institutions can afford the legally trained personnel that would be required if full due process rights are given. Koblitz
v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 515
(1901). Another rationale states that the college does not have the
authority to fulfill the responsibility, i.e., the president cannot compel
witnesses to attend the hearing or testify. State ex rel. Ingersoll v.
Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928). "It
certainly cannot be maintained that it [student disciplinary proceeding]
means a hearing like that which constitutes the trial of a chancery suit,...
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basic question whether due process rights were available to college
students finally culminated in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education" and Knight v. State Board of Education.4 These cases
specifically grounded federal jurisdiction in state college student
expulsion cases on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 Dixon was the first to hold that due process requires notice
and some opportunity to be heard before a student at a tax supported college can be expelled.'" The rationale of these cases was
the importance attached to a public education. In Dixon, the court
felt that "without sufficient education the plaintiffs would not be
able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or
to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of
good citizens."': In Knight, the court concurred with the Dixon
holding that the right to attend school was not a mere privilege but
a constitutional right.' In effect, the right to an education is the
opportunity to succeed in life.
To protect that right it is now settled that dismissal from a state
university or college without the semblance of a hearing would violate procedural due process.'" The next consideration is what this
for there is no power vested in the president of the university to compel the
attendance of witnesses or force them to testify if they were in attendance."
Id. at 213, 263 P. at 436.
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962). The
case has been extensively noted: 14 ALA. L. REv. 126 (1961); 50 GEo. L.J.
314 (1961); 75 HARv. L. REv. 1429 (1962); 60 Micn. L. REv. 499 (1962);
15 VAND. L. Rxv. 1005 (1962).
14200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
15 Cases cited notes 13, 14 supra. See also, In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360,
137 S.E.2d 150 (1964), a recent North Carolina case which held that a
student expelled from the University of North Carolina was entitled to
judicial review under the state statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316
(1953) ; Note, Judicial Review-ProceduralDue Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings, 43 N.C.L. REv. 152 (1965).
18294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962).
7
Id. at 157.
"' "[T]he fact remains that it [college education] is an interest of almost
23

incalculable value ....

Private interests are to be evaluated under the due

process clause... not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of their
true significance and worth." 200 F. Supp. at 178.
1" Cases cited notes 13, 14 supra. See also, Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1964). "Dismissal from college affects a student's life too
drastically to be left to even the barest possibility of arbitrary action by
college administrators. Expulsion carries with it an ineradicable stigma
which usually prevents admission to another institution, with the result that
a student's chances for higher education may be gone forever." Jacobson,
The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law. 34 J. HIGHER ED.
250, 254-55 (1963).
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hearing that deprives a student of his right to an education should
encompass. Madera, involving possible incarceration or expulsion,
limited itself to the right to counsel issue. Should the right to
counsel be one procedural due process right granted to the high
school disciplinary proceeding? In Matter of Goldwyn,2" on June
27, 1967, the court held that the Department of Education acting
solely on the principal's letter could not suspend a high school student's examination privileges without a hearing at which she could
defend herself with the assistance of counsel. 21 In areas outside
the educational cases, courts have stressed the importance of the
right to counsel at a hearing. In Powell v. Alabama,22 the court
held that one of the basic components of a hearing in a criminal
case was the right to counsel, and a denial of that right would be
denial of a hearing.23 In administrative proceedings which are
purely investigatory rather than adjudicative in nature, there is no
general right to counsel.2 4 But if there is a right to a hearing as a
matter of procedural due process, i.e., if there is a constitutionally
protected right, 25 then denial of counsel may result in the hearing's
failure to meet the test of fairness.2 6 The right to be represented
by counsel is presently regarded as an essential element of our system of criminal justice.2 7 Thus, the right to a hearing to meet the
constitutional standard of fairness requires the right to counsel, if
desired. This conclusion gives strength to the holding in Madera
on the right to counsel issue.
What other procedural rights should encompass the high school
suspension hearing besides the right to counsel? Obviously more
than the right to counsel is involved. One commentator argued
for the full panoply of procedural safeguards:
20 157 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Super. Ct. Queens County, June 27 1967). For a
discussion of the case see TIME, July 14, 1967 at 41; 9 WEL. L. BUuL. 2
(July 1967).
157 N.Y.L.J. 17
2.287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23 Id. at 68-69.
" Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944), noted in 58 CoLum.
L. REV. 395 (1958). See also, Rauh & Pollitt, Right to and Nature of
Representation Before Congressional Committees, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 853
(1961).
"See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Kennedy, 256 Ala. 478, 55 So.2d 511
(1951); Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So.2d 511 (1944) (due
process contemplates representation by counsel if desired).
-Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 990
(1956).
27 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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When we proudly contrast the full hearings before our courts
with those in the benighted countries which have no due process
protection, when many of our courts are so careful in the protection of those charged with crimes. . . , our sense of justice
should be outraged by denial to students of the normal safeguards. It is shocking that the officials of a state educational
institution. . should not understand the elementary principles
of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court supports
them in denying to a student the protection given to a pick28
pocket.
Dixon sets forth a model of the procedural rights that should be
given to the college student disciplinary proceeding, following the
tone of the above comment. The court in Dixon stated that there
must be advance notice to the student which should "contain a
statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven,
would justify expulsion. .
The hearing should allow presentation of both sides of the case in considerable detail.8 0 Although
cross-examination is not required, the student should be given the
M
names of the witnesses against him and a report of their testimony."
He should be allowed to present his own defense and to present oral
testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.8"
The courts facing the problem of what procedural standards
should apply to high school hearings could stop with the college
cases and conclude by analogy that the right to a hearing, the right
to counsel, and the model of procedural safeguards outlined in
Dixon should apply equally to the student expelled from high school.
Nevertheless, there appears to be something inherently different
between high school and college. Colleges are more selective and
optional; only the qualified can be admitted. High schools are open
to everyone, and compulsory in that society desires that everyone
should attend high school. Courts may look beyond the college cases
because of this distinction and the additional factor that involuntary incarceration may result from the high school hearing either
directly as in Madera or indirectly by referral from the school proceeding to the juvenile court. Thus the courts may look to the
juvenile courts for guidance for the high school proceeding. InSeavy, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAv. L. Rav. 140607 (1957).
29294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961).
"Old. at 159.
31
Id.
"..",0

2"

32 Id.

1968]

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

deed, it may be that high school suspension whether there is possible
incarceration or not is so different from the college suspension that
the analogy to the juvenile court procedural rights should always be
considered.
The theory behind a juvenile court proceeding and a high school
guidance conference is essentially the same, i.e., rehabilitation. Both
seek to formulate what will be best for the child so that he will
be a positive rather than a negative factor to society's interests.
The juvenile is made "to feel that he is the object of [the State's]
care and solicitude," 33 so the proceedings are not adversary but
the state is proceeding as parens patriae.34 Nevertheless, there is
presently little disagreement that the due process clause has a part
in these hearings.3 In Kent v. United States, 6 the United States
Supreme Court, regarding the juvenile court statute which was
ambiguous on this point, said:
there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony, without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement
measure up to the essentials
of reasons. . . [T]he hearing must
38
of due process and fair treatment.
On May 15, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States (Fortas, J.), relying in part upon the Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,3 9
reiterated the above quote, and specifically held for constitutional
reasons in In re Gault4" that a juvenile has right to notice of the
charges, 41 to counsel, 42 to confrontation and cross-examination of
" Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAgv. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909).
,Id. at 109.
Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387
(1961); Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court, 52 A.B.A.J. 923
(1966); Ketcham, The Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 585 (1965); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN.
L. REv. 547 (1957); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation inthe Juvenile Courts,
67 COLUm. L. REv. 281 (1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police,
State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1966).
80383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17Id.at 554.
I Id. at 562.
"PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, at 55-56,
78, 80-81, 84-87 (1967). [hereinafter cited as PRESmENT'S COMMISSION]

,o87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
Id. at 1446.
"Id. at 1451. See also, Lehman, A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a
Delinquency Hearing, 17 JUVENILE CT. JUDGE'S JoURNAL 53 (1966); The
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witnesses, 43 and to the privilege against self-incrimination. 4 In
granting these procedural due process rights to juveniles, the Court
felt that recent reports 45 suggest "that the appearance as well as
actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the
essentials of due process may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned." 40
It would seem that if appropriate due process is followed in
high school expulsions the student will similarly feel he is being
treated fairly and will respond to the decisions of the board more
readily. Denver Judge Rubin at a recent meeting of National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges echoed this sentiment:
The present system, which shuns the adversary system and prefers flexible and informal deliberations, denies consistent legal
protection to the child. As a result, the child does not understand
himself or the system. By incorporation of Constitutional safeguards into this system, individualized justice can become a
4
reality. 7

Similarly the informal high school hearing denies consistent legal
protection in that its actions may be arbitrary or cursory. What the
appropriate due process rights given to the high school student are
will depend on the jurisdiction and the possible consequences of the
disciplinary hearing. If the only outcome of the hearing would
be expulsion, temporary or permanent, perhaps the college cases
alone should apply. If college and high school are regarded as fundamentally and inherently different, then perhaps the procedural
safeguards laid down in Gault are applicable. When numerous
drastic consequences could result as in Madera, a high school stuPresident's Crime Commission felt "that no single action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court
than provision of counsel." PRESIDENT'S COmIsSION 86.

"87 S. Ct. at 1459.
,87 S. Ct. at 1458. The Supreme Court of the United States has broadly
applied the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his
liberty. "The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or
civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory." Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964); accord, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
"IF. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (1964); The
President's Crime Commission concluded: "There is increasing evidence
that the informal procedures... may . . . engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and changeless exercise of
authority.

. . ."

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

S. Ct. at 1443.
?TIME, August 4, 1967 at 68.

4"87

85.
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dent facing an expulsion hearing should be given those procedural
due process rights granted to the college student and to the juvenile.
Both society and the student will benefit if some procedural safeguards are granted to the high school suspension hearing rather
than arbitrary procedural laxness.
ERIC MILLS HOLMES

Criminal Law-Sentencing-Denial of Credit for Time
Served or Longer Sentence Imposed at Retrial
In Patton v. North Carolina1 Eddie W. Patton was tried in the
Superior Court of North Carolina for armed robbery in October,
1960. He was unrepresented by counsel and entered a plea of nolo
contendere at the close of the state's evidence. He was convicted,
received a sentence of twenty years and did not appeal. However,
after serving nearly five years in prison, he applied for a state postconviction hearing which resulted in a new trial based on the denial
of his constitutional right to counsel at the first trial. Represented
by counsel at the second trial in February, 1965, Patton pleaded not
guilty and was convicted by a jury on the original indictment charging armed robbery. The trial judge purported to give Patton credit
for the nearly five years served on the original twenty year sentence
and then sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.
The effect of this sentence is an increased punishment. Had he
not appealed Patton would have been eligible for parole in October,
1965. If he had not been paroled, and without taking earned time
factors into account, he would have completed the first sentence in
October, 1980. As a result of the sentence at the second trial, Patton will not be eligible for parole until February, 1970, and the
sentence will not terminate until February, 1985. Because he obtained a new trial, Patton will remain in prison five years longer
than if he had not asserted his right to seek a fair trial.
After the second trial, Patton applied to the federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was granted2 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
1381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).

2 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966) ; noted in
1966 DuICE L.J. 1172; 80 HA~v. L. Rlv. 891 (1967); 20 VAND. L. REv.
660 (1967); 12 VIL. L. REv. 380 (1967). See generally Van Alstyne, In
Gideon's Wake: HarsherPenalties and the "Successf d" Crirninai Appellant,
74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
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Harsher sentencing imposed upon a successful criminal appellant
at retrial can be accomplished by denying credit for the time served
under the original sentence or by imposing a longer sentence. This
practice is widespread3 and is most often justified upon two grounds.
It has been said that when the conviction at the first trial is overturned upon appeal or through other appropriate procedural methods
it is then "void," with the result that the sentence imposed at the
first trial is to be ignored thereafter.4 It is also said that when the
appellant seeks post-conviction relief he waives whatever benefit
he may have enjoyed under the first sentence. 5 These theories had
their origin in a different setting. In order to justify the use of
habeas corpus as a tool of review, federal courts granted the writs
"only if the court ordering imprisonment was without jurisdictioni.e., if the order was 'void.'"6 Then, to prevent a defendant from
contending that double jeopardy protection barred a retrial, the
courts generally held that the first sentence was void or that the
defendant waived his rights under the previous conviction."
Patton is significant not only for its result, but because it is
'The North Carolina Supreme Court allows longer sentences with credit

or sentences without credit except that the increased sentence when added
to the time appellant has already served may not exceed the maximum
sentence allowed for the offense. State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d
571 (1966); State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965); State
v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 1005
(1965); State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964); 44 N.C.L.
RFv. 458 (1966). State v. Pearce, supra, was decided after the Patton
decision was rendered in the district court. In refusing to follow that decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated, "We adhere to our
former decisions." State v. Pearce, supra at 708, 151 S.E.2d at 572.
'See e.g., United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d
Cir. 1967); United States v. Harmon, 68 F. 472 (D. Kan. 1895). See
generally Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal
Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rav. 239 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Whalen].
'Whalen 240-44. Van Alstyne 610, suggests two additional rationales
used by other courts:
In other jurisdictions it is said that the appellate court has no authority
to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court within statutory limits,
and that the defendant should look to the executive department for
an exercise of the clemency power. Elsewhere, in rejecting double
jeopardy claims, courts have held with Justice Holmes that a new
trial and sentence is simply a continuation of the same case, and
thus the previous sentence of the defendant does not foreclose independent consideration of an appropriate sentence at the second
trial in that case.
'Whalen 242.
Whalen 240-44. See generally Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE
L.J. 674 (1926).
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the first case at the level of the court of appeals in which the constitutional issues have been fully considered. The court stated
the issue as "whether a defendant may be sentenced to a longer
term of imprisonment at his second trial than he received after his
first conviction, vacated on constitutional grounds."' It found that
a defendant may not be so sentenced and based its decision on three
grounds arising from the United States Constitution.
The first ground grows out of the due process clause.' Had
Patton remained in prison without appealing his unconstitutional
conviction, he could have served out his term to 1980 and could
have been eligible for parole in 1965."0 On the other hand, Patton
could choose to seek his constitutional right to a fair trial by utilizing
appropriate post-conviction remedies. The state tells Patton and
those similarly placed that if he chooses to seek the fair trial, he
does so upon the condition that he give up the right to have the
first sentence remain the same'" and risks a more severe sentence
if convicted at the second trial. The court held that forcing upon the
defendant the risk of harsher punishment as a condition for securing a constitutional right violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. "Enjoyment of a benefit or protection
provided by law," the court said, "cannot be conditioned upon the
'waiver' of a constitutional right."' 2 Although not explicitly spelled
out by the court, it follows by implication that the benefit of a
constitutional right cannot be conditioned upon the waiver of a
8381 F.2dv.636.
'In Hill Holman, 255 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1966), the court held
that denial of credit for time served in this situation was a denial of due
process. The court said:
The constitutional requirements of due process will not permit the

State of Alabama to require petitioner Hill, or any other prisoner
for that matter, to be penalized by service in the state penitentiary
because of an error made by the state circuit court.
Id. at 925.
"0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1964) provides:

All prisoners shall be eligible to have their cases considered for
parole when they have served a fourth of their sentence, if their
sentence is determinate, and a fourth of their minimum sentence, if
their sentence is indeterminate ....

" Under the North Carolina decisions the sentence of a defendant may
not be increased after the term of the trial court has expired and service
of sentence has commenced. State v. Lawrence, 264 N.C. 220, 141 S.E.2d
264 (1965); State v. McLamb, 203 N.C. 442, 166 S.E. 507 (1932); State
v. Warren, 92 N.C. 825 (1885). This rule is followed in all jurisdictions.
615.
Van12Alstyne
381 F.2d at 640.
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benefit or protection provided by state law, in this case the pro13
tection of not having the sentence lengthened.
The doctrine of unconstitutional condition is well established"
and its application in this situation should not be startling. As the
court pointed out, the Supreme Court has been concerned in several
cases with restrictions on a convicted defendant's access to postconviction relief. 5 In an analogous situation the Fourth Circuit
has held that the trial judge must take into account the time a defendant was incarcerated while awaiting trial."0 In United States v.
WalkerlT the same court considered a case where the defendant had
been sentenced in his absence to three years. He successfully attacked the sentence on the ground of his absence and was resentenced
to five years. It was held that the district court had unintentionally
penalized the defendant for asserting his constitutional right to
seek correction and that a constitutional right cannot be so conditioned.' s
" Van Alstyne 616.
"See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). See gewerally 73
HARv. L. Rav. 1595 (1960). In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, supra, a state law operated to prevent a private carrier from
enjoying the benefit of state highways unless it submitted to being regulated
as a common carrier by the railroad commission and being subjected to
common carrier liability. Noting that under the due process clause a private
carrier could not be forcibly converted into a common carrier by legislation, the Court held that the state could not condition use of the state
highways upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right.
" 381 F.2d at 640. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Fay v. Noia, supra,
Noia and two other defendants were convicted of felony murder in 1942.
Noia was sentenced to life imprisonment, his two companions to death.
Noia did not appeal for fear that if he was again convicted he too would
would receive the death penalty. The other two defendants, who did not have
this fear, appealed successfully on the ground that their confessions had been
coerced. They were released in 1955 since the state did not have a case
without the confessions. Noia then decided to appeal, but the state courts
refused relief because his appeal had not been timely. The Supreme Court
held that Noia should have been granted a petition for habeas corpus in
the federal courts because the "grisly choice" which he faced caused him
not to appeal and his choice not to appeal could not "realistically be deemed
a merely tactical or strategic litigation step, or in any way a deliberate
circumvention of state procedures." 372 U.S. at 440.
"Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967). The result in
this case seemed to be based largely on the legislative history behind a
federal statute requiring that such credit be given where the statute defining
the offense requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence.
'346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965).
" The court in Walker relied upon Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184

SENTENCING AT RETRIAL

While adopting the district court's holding on due process and
equal protection grounds, the court of appeals extended the lower
court's holding considerably. At the lower court the holding had
been that if a harsher sentence is given at the second trial, there
must be a "discernable" reason and "facts tending to rationally
The court of
support the imposition of such a penalty. ...
appeals placed an absolute ban on harsher sentences even if there
was additional testimony introduced at the second trial tending to
support a harsher sentence. In this respect the court followed the
First Circuit in Marano v. United States.2 ° That court said, "The
danger that the government may succeed in obtaining more damaging evidence on a retrial is just as real as the danger, for example,
that the judge on his own may wish to reconsider unfavorably to
the defendant, the factors which led to his original disposition."'"
It also pointed out that imposition of a harsher sentence by the same
judge who felt he had been too lenient the first time or by a different
judge "having a different approach towards sentencing . . . might
well be substantial deterrents to a decision to appeal." '2 2 In sum,

3
the court said, "A defendant's right of appeal must be unfettered.
In placing this absolute ban on harsher resentencing, the court in
Patton drew upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect
to the right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright24 it was recognized
that the lack of counsel created an opportunity for unfairness although in a particular case it may not have prejudiced the defendant's rights. To eliminate this opportunity the presumption of
injury was made conclusive. Therefore in Patton the court held

(1957).

In that case Green had been convicted of second degree murder,

had successfully appealed, and upon retrial had been convicted of first degree
murder on the original indictment. The Supreme Court held that Green
could not be tried a second time for first degree murder because such a trial
placed him in double jeopardy. It is significant to note that while placing
its decision on double jeopardy grounds, the Court was greatly concerned
with the fact that the defendant "must be willing to barter his constitutional
protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death
as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another
offense for which he has been sentenced to five to twenty years' imprisonment." The Court concluded that the defendant should not be placed "in
such an incredible dilemma." Id. at 193.
"oPatton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 236 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
20 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
21

Id. at 585.

22 Id.
23 Id.
-,372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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that "the new sentence shall not exceed the old." 25 Thus, the court
makes it impossible to punish the defendant for attacking his original
conviction. The possibility that abuses may go undetected is removed, and the doubtful task of determining whether reasons are
discernable or rationally support the imposition of a harsher sentence is eliminated.
The second basis of the Patton decision was the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Since in North Carolina
there can be no increase in a defendant's sentence after the term
of the trial court has expired and the defendant has begun serving
his sentence,26 the threat of a harsher sentence falls only upon one
class of prisoners-those who seek post-conviction relief. Conceding that the state might create a system to review and, if necessary, increase sentences, the court made clear that it cannot arbitrarily classify those who are exercising their right to obtain a fair
trial as the only group subject to such an increase. Such "an arbi27
trary classification [is] offensive to the equal protection clause."1
2'381 F.2d at 641.
"0Note 11 supra.
"381 F.2d at 642. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), two
indigent defendants were convicted of armed robbery in state court. Inorder
to appeal it was required by state law that the appellant furnish the appellate
court a bill of exceptions or report of the proceedings at the trial. The defendants moved in the trial court that such records be provided to them
without cost since they were indigent. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court recognized that constitutionally a state is not required to
provide appellate review, but it held that a state providing such review may
not "do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants
on account of their poverty." Id. at 18. In Gray v. Hocker, 268 F. Supp.
1004 (D. Nev. 1967), a state statute required that the time for service of
criminal sentences be computed from the date they were imposed. The effect
of the statute was to preclude the trial judge at a retrial of a successful
criminal appellant from allowing credit for time served under the overturned
sentence. Relying on Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the court held the statute
unconstitutional as applied because it deprived the appellant of equal protection of the laws. In Gainey v. Turner, 266 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1967)
the court had before it essentially the same fact situation as in Patton. It
held that harsher resentencing violated the due process and equal protection
clauses. In its discussion of equal protection the court found "no rational
basis for distinguishing as a class those who successfully attack [their convictions] and those who do not." It found "no legitimate or permissable
[governmental] objective that is served by a state's resentencing practice
that results in a denial of credit for time served in the absence of justifiable
reasons that appear in the record." The court pointed out that the state of
North Carolina had enacted no legislation providing for sentence review
which showed that "the legislature has not considered a review of sentences
of compelling state interest." It finally found that since the classification
was arbitrary and there was no compelling state interest served, "no nexus
between the classification and the objective of government can save the re-
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The equal protection ground is relevant to another dimension
of this problem. The proposition that harsher resentencing is prohibited as an unconstitutional condition on the right to a fair trial
would have no application to a defendant whose original trial was
free of constitutional error but had been overturned on some other
ground.2" The equal protection clause, however, does apply in that
situation and would protect that defendant from harsher re29
sentencing.
The Patton court utilized still a third ground for its decision
although noting that it was not necessary to do so." It held that
"the constitutional protection against double jeopardy would be
violated if an increased sentence or a denial of credit is permitted
on retrial.""
In order to invoke the double jeopardy protection provided in
the fifth amendment the court had to get over the hurdle of whether
or not that protection is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The problem was solved in a footnote 2 where
the court relied upon United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkens"3
from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that case it
was pointed out by then Judge Thurgood Marshall that under the
Supreme Court cases "[t]he Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes some limitations on a state's power to reprosecute an individual for the same crime."3 4 The court in Hetenyi
held that the double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states because
the "basic core" of the double jeopardy guarantee is as fundamental
as "those other guarantees of the Bill of Rights already held by the
Supreme Court . . . to be absorbed . . . ,,s3 Although this apsentencing practice in question." The court held that under Quaker City
Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928), these three elements had
to be found for the sentencing practice "to withstand attack under the
Equal Protection Clause." 266 F. Supp. at 101-02. Accord, Patton v. Ross,
267 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
8They were given as fair a trial as the Constitution requires, and
therefore are not required to waive the protection of their original sentence
as a2 condition of obtaining a constitutionally fair trial. Van Alstyne 615-16.
Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967).
3o 381 F.2d at 643.
381 F.2d at 643.
82381 F.2d at 643 n.20.
348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966).
"Id. at 849.
" Id. at 853. The first amendment, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) ; the fourth amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ;
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); the right to counsel
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proach seems to be a reasonable ramification of the selective incorporation theory, in the absence of a direct holding by the Supreme
Court to that effect it is not one of the Patton court's stronger points.
As for the double jeopardy holding itself, the court relied primarily on that aspect of double jeopardy which prohibits multiple
punishment for the same offense.3 The court saw "no constitutionally significant distinction ' ' sr between prohibiting an increase in a
defendant's sentence once service commenced, and a harsher sentence upon retrial for the same offense following a successful appeal.
Patton had also asserted that he was " 'impliedly acquitted' ,s
of any punishment beyond the twenty years originally received and
therefore placed in double jeopardy when subjected to a harsher
sentence. This argument was based on Green v. United States"
in which the Supreme Court held that where an accused had been
convicted of second-degree murder and had successfully appealed,
he could not then be retried for first degree murder. The theory
there was that by returning a verdict of second-degree murder when
it also could have returned a verdict of first-degree murder, the jury
had impliedly acquitted him of the latter charge. The Patton court
admitted with the defendant, however, "that to maintain that he
was 'acquitted' at the first trial of any penalty greater than twenty
years, is as much a fiction as that he has 'waived' the benefit of his
initial sentence by appealing his conviction.""0
and confrontation clauses of the sixth amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); the cruel
and unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment, Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"8Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). In Lange the petitioner had been convicted of a federal offense for which the punishment
was a fine or imprisonment. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and payment of a fine. He was freed on a writ of habeas corpus and
brought before the same judge who had imposed the original sentence for
resentencing. The second time the judge sentenced petitioner only to a
term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that he had to be released
altogether because he had paid his fine, the money having passed out of
the legal control of anyone but Congress, and had served five days on the
first sentence. To have required him to serve the second sentence, after
having paid the fine, would have placed him in double jeopardy. The Court
did "not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being
twice tried for it." Id. at 173.
"'381 F2.d at 645. The court also applied this double jeopardy holding
in Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967).
11381 F.2d at 645.
89355 U.S. 184 (1957).
'0381 F.2d at 645. In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919),
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The Patton decision is welcome and in our enlightened system
of criminal justice could be considered long overdue. It is fundamentally unfair for a state to deprive a prisoner of several years
of his freedom on the basis of an erroneous trial for a particular
crime, and then upon a retrial for the same crime refuse to take
those years into account when resentencing him.
Not everyone will be in agreement with the Patton rule, and it
is significant to note the reasons why. In the recent case of Shear
v. Boles41 the federal district court defended vigorously the right of
a trial judge to impose a harsher sentence at a second trial after a
successful appeal. There it was said that a federal habeas corpus
court should exercise "judicial restraint" because of "the fear of
undermining the traditional role of the trial judge."'
The argument is that the trial judge has "the benefit of presentence reports,
. . . can observe, first hand, the demeanor of the defendant . . .

and is most aware of the actual as well as the extenuating circumstances of the defendant's crime."43 These are points well taken in
a defense of the traditional discretion of the trial judge in sentencing.
It should be pointed out that if the defendant did not plead
guilty or nolo contendere at the first trial and received a full trial
the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and received a life
sentence. That conviction was reversed, he was retried for first degree
murder, and after a second conviction he was sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court upheld the sentence in the face of double jeopardy arguments.
The court in Patton distinguished Stroud in that it appeared "that the case
was argued to the Court on the theory that the defendant was put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense merely by being retried on an indictment
for first degree murder." 381 F.2d at 644. The muliple punishment aspect
of double jeopardy was not considered in Stroud. In People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963), the California
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy protection of the California
constitution would prohibit a second conviction for the same degree of the
same offense after a successful appeal of the first conviction in which a
non-constitutional error had been committed. The court relied upon the
"implied acquittal" rationale of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
,P263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
42 Id. at 859.
In United States ex reL. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808
(3d Cir. 1967), it was said:
It is submitted it would be a flagrant trespass of an independent state
judiciary, to question its discretionary judgment, in the imposition
of a sentence, where the trial judge, in the possession of all the facts
relative thereto, in a proceeding in a Federal court on a writ of habeas
corpus-already ruled on by the highest tribunal of the state-would
vacate the same, unless it clearly flouted constitutional standards of
due process.
Id. at 812.
"8Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855, 859 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
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with the state introducing as much evidence as it legally may, the
trial judge at that trial had all of the desired information and exercised his discretion as to sentencing to the fullest extent. When the
judge at a retrial revises an original sentence thus imposed, he is
in effect reviewing the original sentence. The equal protection
clause militates against such selective review of the sentences of
only those convicted defendants who appeal.
Further resistance to the Patton rule will come from those who
fear that at the second trial new evidence will appear clearly showing
that the first sentence was inadequate. This evidence generally will
be introduced to bear on the defendant's guilt but will ultimately
induce the judge to impose a harsher sentence; it will be of a nature
showing that defendant's conduct was unusually heinous. Were
harsher resentencing allowed after such new evidence, abuses would
surely result. The prosecution could endeavor to turn up evidence
more damaging to the defendant at the second trial, just as the
same judge might want to change his mind at the second trial."
Theoretically the prosecution will have had a full opportunity at the
first trial to introduce all evidence which might in the end bear on
the sentence. There would seem to be no compelling reason to give
the prosecution a second chance. It is true that there may be instances when it would have been impossible for the new evidence
to have been unearthed for use at the first trial. In such a case the
defendant would unfairly benefit. The considerations supporting
the general application of the rule should outweigh the possibility
that such a case might arise, and there should be no abolition of the
rule just because of this limited situation. There is no reason that
an exception could not be made for this type of situation, assuming
workable standards could be laid down.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, while prohibiting
harsher resentencing as a general proposition, would allow it based
on events occurring subsequent to the first trial and contained in a
presentence report.45 Defendants who do not appeal do not have
their sentences increased because of their bad behavior, however;
thus, it is a denial of equal protection to increase the sentences of
those who do appeal. The state has adequate means to allow for
bad behavior subsequent to trial, e.g., denial of parole.
The court in Shear points out that where a defendant pleads
"Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1967).
45Id.
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guilty following arrest, thus avoiding the necessity for a trial, "the
first sentencing judge may not have had a meaningful opportunity
to weigh . . . the defendant's . . . character and to consider the
other important, intangible factors which play a vital role in the
determination of a sentence." 4 When the defendant pleads not
guilty at the second trial, presumably the judge at that trial is
afforded such an opportunity. Many convicted defendants have
pleaded guilty after arrest and are serving the sentences received
without appealing. No judge will ever have an opportunity to
weigh the character of those defendants or to consider other intangible factors and adjust their sentence accordingly. It is only by
denying an equal measure of protection to an appealing defendant
that his sentence can be lengthened.
In United States ex rel. Starnerv. Russell"' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in justifying harsher sentences at retrial,
noted that federal and state courts generally follow the practice of
extending leniency when the defendant pleads guilty and do not do
so when the defendant chooses to go to trial.48 The implication
apparently is that leniency at the first trial justifies the harsher sentence at the second trial. This practice is a clear illustration of penalizing the defendant merely for seeking a full and fair trial.
It could be argued that the result in Patton will lead to the imposition of a harsher sentence in the first trial so that if the defendant
appeals and gets a new trial the second trial judge will not be restricted to a sentence that might seem to him to be inadequate. This
practice would seem to be highly unlikely in view of the gross unfairness to all defendants so sentenced and of the many other factors that influence the trial judge in imposing sentences.
It should be asked whether the Patton decision might be applicable to other situations. Suppose a driver, after having been
stopped on the highway by a law enforcement officer for exceeding
the speed limit, is asked to open his trunk to let the officer examine
its contents. If the driver complies with the request he may not
receive a traffic ticket but only a warning. If he refuses, he is sure
to receive the ticket. The driver complies and in his trunk is found
incriminating evidence that leads to his conviction for a crime
completely unrelated to the speeding. Has the driver "waived"
" Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855, 860 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
808 (3d Cir. 1967).
"8Id.378 atF.2d
812.
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his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, or is
the waiver one that is forced and not of free choice as is the purported waiver of the defendant who decides to appeal his conviction?
Suppose a person is arrested and charged with a crime. The
officials offer the accused and his attorney the following proposition:
if the accused will plead guilty to a lesser charge the state will reciprocate by recommending leniency and by other rewards usually
offered where guilty-plea bargaining is carried on. The accused and
his attorney, after weighing the chances of conviction and of receiving a heavier sentence if there is a not guilty plea, decide to
accept the offer. 9 Is this situation essentially different from the
situation of the convicted defendant who weighs his chances of
a heavier sentence and decides not to appeal?50
Suppose a state statute provides that a defendant indicted for
first degree murder may plead guilty, with the consent of the court
and the district attorney, and in that event he may only be sentenced to life imprisonment if convicted. 5 ' Such a statute would
mean that if the defendant pleads not guilty, there would be a trial
at which he might receive the death penalty. Can the state constitutionally allow the defendant to exercise his right to a jury trial only
at the peril of receiving the death penalty?
Finally, suppose a defendant is convicted of a crime in a court of
limited jurisdiction within the state such as a city court. A fine is
imposed along with court costs. He then appeals to a court of
general jurisdiction such as the state superior court for a trial de
novo. He is again convicted, but a heavier fine is imposed and
the defendant has to pay the higher court costs. Is this such a
restriction on the right to appeal as would be prohibited by the
Patton court?
PENDER R. MCELROY
"'A similar situation is posed in L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 505 (1966).
"0It should be pointed out that guilty-plea bargaining is an entirely acceptable and presently necessary function. Further, the choice of the de-

fendant is admittedly more freely made than the choice in the Patton
situation.
"1N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 1045(2), 1045a (McKinney, Supp. 1966). This
statute is presently being challenged on the ground that it conditions the
exercise of the right to a hearing upon the risk of death. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 14-16, Moore v. State, pending in the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
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Evidence-Privileged Communications-Accountant
and Client
At common law no privilege for confidential communications ,
between an accountant and his client was recognized.'
Nor does
an accountant-client privilege exist in the federal system.2 Evzin
1
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953) ; It re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; see
Clayton v. Canida, 223 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1949). The only
privileges recognized at common law were the attorney-client privilege,
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE], and the husband-wife privilege, 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 101 (1961). A substantial majority of jurisdictions
have enacted statutes creating physician-patient and priest-penitent privileges, WIGMORE § 2286; See also 46 N.C.L. Rnv. -(1967).
In recent
years the attorney-client privilege has been extended to include the accountant when employed by the attorney, United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918
(2d Cir. 1961). This extension of the attorney-client privilege was rejected
as recently as 1949, however, in Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949), where the accountant
was hired by the attorney to aid in preparation of a tax fraud case. The
court said that the presence of the accountant was a convenience and not
indispensable as the presence of the attorney's secretary might be.

Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).

Accord,

However, in

Kovel, where the accountant, employed full time by the law firm, was

held in contempt in the district court for refusing to testify concerning
alleged tax violations of a client of the law firm, the court of appeals
reversed, stating that "[T]he presence of the accountant is necessary...
for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer, which the
privilege is designed to permit." 296 F.2d at 922. The privilege established
in the Kovel case was extended to include the accountant's work papers in
United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963), where the attorney
advised his client to obtain a net worth statement. The client engaged an
accountant who prepared the statement and gave it to the attorney, who
was then served with a subpoena duces tecuin to produce the statement
and the accountant's work papers. The Ninth Circuit reversed the position
it had taken in Himmelfarb, holding that these documents constituted confidential communications within the attorney-client privilege. However,
where the attorney is also an accountant, accounting services are not
covered by the attorney-client privilege. Olender v. United States, 210
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952); In re
Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). This narrow extension of the attorney-client privilege is recognized only when the client communicates first
with an attorney who then retains an accountant. Furthermore, the accountant's services must consist of accounting work required by the attorney
in giving legal rather than accounting advice. United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th
Cir. 1954).
'United States v. Bowman, 236 F. Supp. 548, 550 (M.D. Pa. 1964);
United States v. Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419, 434 (D. Md. 1963); In re
Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Stoehr, 100
F. Supp. 143, 162 (M.D. Pa. 1951); It re Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857,
860 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
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t1iough several jurisdictions have enacted statutes creating such a
privilege, there is considerable doubt among the authorities that
\the privilege is in the public interest.8 This comment is directed to
the question of whether the need to protect the accountant-client
relationship is sufficient to justify the incidental sacrifices in the
effective administration of justice.
The evidentiary privileges in no way aid the ascertainment of
truth.4 To justify the establishment of a privilege, the general
duty of every man to give all relevant testimony must be overcome,
and any exemption from this duty must be regarded as an exception
to the general rule.5 Dean Wigmore's four fundamental conditions
of social policy are generally recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege:
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence
that will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties; (3) the relation must be one
which, in the opinion of community, ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the proper disposal of litigation.0
In recent years several state legislatures have concluded that
a privilege for the accountant-client relation satisfies these conditions. Fifteen states and Puerto Rico have enacted statutes
conferring the status of privileged communications upon professional information obtained by accountants. 7 Although there
8

J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE ACCOUNTING
[hereinafter cited as CAREY & DOHERTY]; WIGMORE § 2286.

PROFESSION 134 (1966)

' C. McCoRRicx, EVIDENCE

'WIGMORE

§ 2192.

§ 72 (1954); 16 TEXAS L. REv. 447 (1938).

'Id. § 2285.
"Arizona: "[C.P.A.'s] and public accountants . . . shall not be required
to divulge, nor... voluntarily divulge information which they have received
by reason of the confidential nature of their employment ....
[the section
does not apply to criminal or bankruptcy matters]." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-749 (Supp. 1966). Colorado: "A [C.P.A.] shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client,
to him in person or through ... books of account and financial records, or
his advice, reports or working papers given or made thereon in the course
of professional employment ... ." COLO. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (7)
(1963). In Pattie Lea Inc. v. District Court,
Colo.
-,
423 P.2d
27 (1967), a state court for the first time was called upon to interpret a
statute creating an accountant-client privilege. In this case the defendant
corporations sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the taking of a deposition of a certified public accountant concerning his preparation of audits,
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financial statements, annual reports and income tax returns for the defendants. The court determined that under the Colorado statute any confidential communications made by a client to a certified public accountant in
the course of his professional employment fell within the statutory privilege.
Florida: "All communications between [C.P.A.'s] and public accountants
and the person for whom such [C.P.A.] or public accountant shall have
made any audit or other investigation in a professional capacity, and all
information obtained . . . in their professional capacity concerning the

business and affairs of clients shall be deemed privileged ...

"

FLA. STAT.

§ 473.15 (1965).
Georgia: "Any communication to any practicing [C.P.A.] transmitted
to such accountant in anticipation of, or pending, the employment of such
accountant shall be treated as confidential and not . .. divulged by said
accountant in any proceedings. . . ." GA. CoDn ANN. § 84-216 (1955).
Illinois: "A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge
information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential
capacity as a public accountant." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110Y2, § 51 (SmithHurd 1966).
Jowa: "The information acquired by registered practitioners . . . in
the course of professional engagements shall be deemed . . . privileged,
and except by written permission of the clients involved .. . shall not be
disclosed . .. provided [the section does not apply to criminal or bank-

ruptcy matters]."

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 116.15 (1949).

Kentucky: "A [C.P.A.] or public accountant shall not be required by
any court to divulge information or evidence which has been obtained
by him in his confidential capacity as such." Ky. REv. STAT. § 325.440
(1962).
Louisiana: "No [C.P.A.], public accountant, or person employed by
[a C.P.A.] or public accountant, shall be required to, or voluntarily...
divulge . .. any communications made to him by any person employing
him to examine, audit, or report on any books, records, or accounts . . .
except by express permission of the person employing him. . . " LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:85 (1964).
Maryland: "Except by express permission of the person employing him
a [C.P.A.] or public accountant or any person employed by him shall
not be required to . .. divulge .. .any communications made to him by
any person employing him to examine, audit or report on any books, records,
accounts or statements nor any information derived therefrom in rendering professional service; provided [the section does not apply to criminal
or bankruptcy matters]." MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A, § 20 (1957).
Michigan: "Except by written permission of the client . . . a [C.P.A.]
or public accountant . .. shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily
. . .divulge information . ...in connection with any examination of,
audit of, or report on, any books, records, or accounts which he . . .may
be employed to make. This section shall not be construed as prohibiting
the disclosure of information to a third party having an interest in or relying
on an opinion rendered by a [C.P.A.]." MicH. STAT. ANN. § 18.23 (Stat.
Release 19, 1967).
Missouri: Statute was enacted in 1967 and the citation is not available.
Nevada: "An accountant cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment. . . ." NEv. REv.
STAT.

§ 48.065 (1957).

New Mexico: "A certified or registered public accountant sball not be
required by any court to divulge information or evidence which has been
obtained by him in his confidential capacity as such. ... " NM. STAT.
ANN. § 67-23-26 (1953).
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are substantial variations among these statutes,8 the overall trend
is toward the creation of a broad accountant-client privilege. As
this trend may soon come to the attention of the North Carolina
General Assembly, an analysis of the privilege is desirable.
Pennsylvania: "Except by permission of the client . . . a [C.P.A.] ...
shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily . . . divulge information

in connection with any professional services as a [C.P.A.] other than
the examination of, audit of or report on any financial statements, books,
records or accounts, which he may be engaged to make. .

.

[the section does not apply to criminal or bankruptcy matters]."

. Provided

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 63, § 9.11a (Supp. 1966).

Puerto Rico: "No court shall require a [C.P.A.] or public accountant to
divulge information or evidence obtained by him in his confidential capacity
as such." P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 20, § 790 (1961).
Tennessee: "[C.P.A.'s] . . . shall not divulge nor shall they

. . .

be re-

quired to divulge, any information which may have been communicated to
them .. . by reason of the confidential nature of their employment....

[E]xcept [the section does not apply to criminal or bankruptcy matters]."
TENN. CoDE ANN. § 62-114 (1955).
"There are four major variations among the statutes. First, some of
the statutes apply only to certified public accountants [Colorado, Georgia,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee], whereas others extend the privilege to
include 'public accountants" or to public accounting generally. A certified
public accountant is a public practitioner in accountancy who holds a certificate issued after he has met the statutory qualifications of the issuing state.
The meaning of the term "public accountant" may vary somewhat from
state to state. See note 15 infra. In most states a public accountant is a
public practitioner in accountancy who is registered to practice after
meeting certain prescribed statutory qualifications. In all cases the requirements for registration are considerably less than those for certification.
Second, a number of the statutes specifically provide that the privilege is
not applicable in situations involving criminal or bankruptcy laws [Arizona,
Iowa, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Tennessee], whereas the others appear
to apply to all situations. Third, some of the statutes specifically exclude
certain types of accountancy services, whereas the others appear to apply
to all such services. The Pennsylvania statute excludes information acquired
by the C.P.A. in "the examination of, audit of or report on any financial
statements, books, records or accounts. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
9.11a (Supp. 1966). This is discussed in United States v. Bowman, 358
F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1966). In 1967, Michigan amended its statute to include
the following statement: "This section shall not be construed as prohibiting
the disclosure of information to a third party having an interest in or
relying on an opinion rendered by a certified public accountant." Micir.
STAT. ANN. § 18.23 (Stat. Release 19, 1967). Fourth, several of the
statutes are not clear as to whether the privilege inures to the benefit of
the client or the accountant. In Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.
IIl. 1963), the court interpreted the Illinois statute as creating an "accountant" privilege since the statute does not mention a "client". If the Dorfman
decision is a proper one, the Arizona, Kentucky, New Mexico, Puerto
Rico and Tennessee statutes are ostensibly open to similar interpretations.
The other statutes refer to the "client" and generally require the client's
consent before confidences may be divulged by the accountant. Such a
statute has been interpreted as creating a "client" privilege. Weck v. District Court,

-

Colo. -,

408 P,2d 987 (1965).
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Dean Wigmore has embodied in his four fundamental conditions of policy the basic philosophy of a privilege against testimonial disclosure. 9 The accountant-client privilege satisfies the
first condition in that only confidential communications are protected. The second condition, that this element of confidentiality
is essential to the full maintenance of the relation between the parties, is also satisfied by the privilege because the client must disclose
highly confidential financial details. However, it is important to
consider the second condition as it relates to condition four. It is
of little value to say that the privilege is necessary to the full maintenance of the relation when the status of the relation is only
slightly less than satisfactory without the privilege. The importance lies in the incremental benefit gained from the establishment
of the privilege, which must be weighed against incidental detriments to the administration of justice. The third condition, that
the community opinion foster the relation, also appears to be satisfied since there is increasing reliance by the general public on the
services of certified public accountants.' 0 However, the extent to
which the relation is to be fostered must also be a matter of degree
and considered in relation with condition four. The state and
national professional organizations of certified public accountants
and state legislatures have recognized that it is in the public interest
to foster the accountant-client relationship, and have gone to great
lengths to do so." The result is that the C.P.A. has attained the
'WIGMORE
" J. C~ARY,

§TnE
2285.CPA PLANS FOR

THE

FUTUan 120-27 (1965)

[herein-

after1 cited as CAREY].

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has developed
a strict code of ethics, AICPA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1967), and
the state societies have adopted similar rules, CAREY 330. The states have
fostered the accountant-client relation by the voluntary acceptance of a uniform C.P.A. examination, CAREY 464, and most states have granted statutory authority to boards of accountancy to form legally enforceable rules of
professional conduct, CAREY & DOHERTY 8. Furthermore, there is a growing
majority of states adopting "regulatory" licensing statutes, Heimbucher,
Fifty-three Jurisdictions,112 J. ACCOUNTANCY 42 (Nov. 1961). "The basic
philosophy underlying the regulatory statutes is that the independent audit
function is so affected with the public interest that all who engage in such
practice should be required to meet certain statutory standards of qualifica-

tions and conduct." Id. Generally, these statutes restrict the use of public
accountancy titles to those who have met the prescribed qualifications for
certification as a C.P.A. To avoid retroactively depriving public accountants already in practice of their means of livelihood, these laws must
provide for licensing this group. However, most regulatory laws do not
provide for the continued licensing of public accountants. Thus, the practi-
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status of a true professional and has been accorded the respect of
the community.' The client is well protected against the voluntary
disclosure of confiidential information by his C.P.A.'8 But is it
in the best interest of the community to foster the relationship to
such an extent that a court of law will be unable to compel disclosures of confidences?
The fourth and most important condition prevents justification
of the accountant-client privilege. To satisfy this condition the
benefits gained from the privilege must exceed on balance the detriments which may result in the administration of justice. Proponents of the privilege argue that the relationship will benefit in that
the client's hesitancy to make full disclosure will be removed, thus
making it possible for the C.P.A. to function more effectively. To
show that this benefit is not of sufficient importance to satisfy the
fourth condition, it is helpful to examine the three principal functions of the C.P.A.-taxation, auditing and management consulting services. 4
The primary interest of C.P.A.'s who desire an accountantclient privilege is to promote full disclosure of information necessary for the preparation of income tax returnsY This is based on
the premise that the privilege would protect clients who may be unjustly charged with fraud or need protection against "fishing expeditions."' 6 Although the cases are somewhat inconsistent, the federal courts generally refuse to apply state accountant-client privileges
in federal tax investigations-'r Therefore, the privilege is virtually
cal effect of these laws is that ultimately the practice of public accountancy
will be restrited to C.P.A.'s, CAREY 476. In the states that have not enacted
regulatory laws, so-called "permissive" laws are in effect. These lavs
provide only for granting the C.P.A. title to those who qualify and permit
anyone else to use similar titles such as "public accountant" and to perform
all types of accountancy services, including independent audits. Heintbucher,
supra, at 43.
CAREY 485.
JJ. Carey, Professional Ethics and the Ptblic Interest, 102 J. AccOuNTANCY 38, 41 (Nov. 1956).
CAREY & DOHERTY 18.
2"

327.
In Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953), the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the Florida accountant-client privilege statute and enforced a summons which compelled an
accountant to testify and to bring all documents relating to the client's income
tax return. Accord, In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d
122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). But see Baird v.
Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), where an attorney refused to disCAREY

'

Id.

IT
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useless in the area of taxation. Even if this were not the case, it
is doubtful that the privilege would encourage disclosures, the protection of which would be in the public interest. If the taxpayer
gives the C.P.A. full and accurate information, his taxes will be
computed correctly by a competent practitioner. In the event of
a spot-check, all deductions could be readily explained without doing
injury to the accountant-client relation. The same is true for an
unintentional failure to disclose certain information since payment
of the deficiency would likely end the matter. If non-disclosure
and hence underpayment by the taxpayer is intentional, it is in
the public interest to insure that correct taxes are paid and that
a tax fraud does not go unchecked. Therefore, an accountantclient privilege does not inure to the benefit of the honest citizen,
but would assist the perpetrator of a tax fraud.'" In the area of
taxation there is little, if any, benefit which inures to the relationship
as a result of the privilege.
The auditing or attest function of the C.P.A. "results in the
expression of an opinion by an independent expert that a communication of economic data by one party to another is fairly presented."' 9 The position that corporate management will be unduly
hesitant to make disclosures to an auditor if the court can compel
the auditor to disclose confidences appears to be unfounded. If
adequate information is not made available to the auditor, he must
render a qualified opinion or disclaim certain aspects of the enterprise's operation. Such an opinion can only serve as notice to
potential investors and creditors of a possible weakness in the enterprise. The economic pressures on corporate management to secure
a favorable opinion is sufficient to overcome any hesitancy to disclose
material information. It is true that management is reluctant to
close the name of his client to an internal revenue agent. The Ninth Circuit
applied the attorney-client privilege to reverse a civil contempt judgment
against the attorney. The court held that this was a "civil" case as opposed
to an administrative proceeding. Compare Baird with FTC v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962), where the court attempted to explain the inconsistency between Falsone and Baird. But in Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963),
the Second Circuit said that "[W]e do not agree .. .that a hearing held
by the Internal Revenue Service . .. is a 'civil action' governed by state
evidence law . . .or that state law should govern for any other reason."
See Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications, and Section 7602
of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 ST. Louis U. L. J. 252 (1965).

"s
37 Ciai. BAR RECORD 291 (1956).

"0Bevis, The CPA's Attest Function in Modern Society, 113 J. AccouNTANcY

28 (Feb. 1962).
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disclose more information than is necessary for fear that competitors will benefit from these disclosures. These fears appear unjustifiable as modem managements "seem to be able to find out
in one way or another what they want to know about their competitors."20 As a practical matter, it does not appear that an auditor's effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by a privilege. Furthermore, some writers and legislators have expressed concern
that the privilege is inconsistent with the auditor's independence.2 1
The auditor's code of ethics requires that he remain independent
and disclose to the public any material finding necessary to prevent
a misleading financial statement. Suppose an auditor makes a
finding that affects the client's financial position and its disclosure
may prove detrimental to the client. Will the fact that this finding
is privileged against disclosure in a court of law affect the auditor's
determination of whether it should be disclosed to third parties?
Might the auditor be tempted to gamble for the protection of the
client? To forego any adverse effects, two states have specifically
excluded the auditing function from the privilege.22
Management services rendered by C.P.A.'s are generally internal
services such as inventory valuation policies, depreciation procedures, advice on investment problems and many other such services.2 s
Management often desires these services when faced with a problem beyond the scope of the accountants inside the corporation, or
it may merely desire an independent analysis of a problem. Since
the services rendered are to be used internally, these services cannot
be distinguished from the work done by inside accountants. As
agents of the corporate principal, inside accountants have a fiduciary
duty of non-disclosure of confidential information.2 4 The C.P.A.
rendering management services, as an agent of the corporate client
or as a professional practitioner subject to his code of ethics, has
a similar duty of non-disclosure. In the face of litigation, no privilege is recognized for confidential communications between the
corporate principal and the inside accountant. Such a privilege is
obviously not in the public interest since it would insulate virtually
all business transactions. No jurisdiction has a statute creating
20
21

22

CAREY

144.

134.
See note 8 supra.
Michigan and Pennsylvania.
CAREY & DOHERTY

:'CAREY & DOHERTY

' W.

107.

SEAV Y, LAW OF AGENCY §

152 (1964).
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an employer-employee privilege.' 5 How then can a privilege be
justified between a management services consultant and a corporate
client?
In the report of the American Bar Association's Committee on
the Improvement of the Law of Evidence in 1937-38,26 the committee recommended a strict application of existing privileges and
recommended against further recognition of so called "novel privileges." Since that date several jurisdictions have failed to heed
these recommendations. Most of the statutes noted above have
been enacted since 1938. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants has not adopted a position either in favor of
or in opposition to the privilege since it may be detrimental to the
profession's interest.2 7 State C.P.A. societies are not affiliated
with the Institute and it is these societies that sponsor privilege
legislation. However, legislators are faced with the realities that
the privilege is (a) virtually useless in the area of taxation, (b) of
negligible benefit, and possibly a hindrance, to the effectiveness of
the audit function, and (c) unwarranted as to management consultants. The benefits gained by the accountant-client relation due
to the privilege are slight, and do not exceed on balance the
injury that would inure to the effective administration of justice.
HAROLD N. BYNUM
Evidence-Privileged Communications-The New North
Carolina Priest-Penitent Statute
In 1967 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new
priest-penitent' privilege statute. 2 The statute is the second of its
WIGMO a § 2286.
263 ABA REP. 570, 595 (1938).
,Letter from Timothy T. McCaffrey, state legislation Manager, AICPA,
to Harold N. Bynum, Sept. 14, 1967.
' Usage of the term "priest-penitent" is common as a characterization of
the relationship which exists between any clergyman of any religious faith
and one who receives his professional aid. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 263 (1957).
One of the most liberal extensions of this group to whom the privilege is
applied is found in Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290
(1917), in which admissions of fornication by a young woman before a
Presbyterian body of elders were held a confidential communication.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1 (1967):
No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or a
clergyman or ordained minister of an established church shall be
competent to testify in any action, suit or proceeding concerning any
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kind passed in North Carolina, the first having been enacted in 1959
and amended in 1963. a Aside from the interesting fact that the
former statute was substantially altered only eight years after its
enactment, the changes in at least three important respects reveal
with greater clarity the present status of the privilege in this state.
It is the purpose of this note to discuss the changes made and their
effects, and to comment upon problems left unresolved.
First, the requirement that the communicant object to the testimony of the clergyman was removed to make the privilege more
absolute.4 Under the former statute an objection by the communicant was required to evoke the privilege, and a failure to object was
interpreted as a waiver of the privilege.6 As a practical matter this
means that the jury may be less prejudiced in that the court, rather
than the communicant, calls forth the testimonial immunity. But
it does not necessarily follow that the privilege exists apart from its
benefit to the communicant, for he alone can waive the privilege.6
Assuming that it exists for the benefit of the communicant alone,
then clearly it cannot be claimed by the priest to protect himself
once it has been waived.
Only in open court can the privilege be waived. An express
rather than an implied waiver seems to be favored, but the latter
information which was communicated to him and entrusted to
him in his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of
his practice or discipline, wherein such person so communicating
such information about himself or another is seeking spiritual counsel
and advice relative to and growing out of the information so imparted,
provided, however, that this section shall not apply where communicant in open court waives the privilege conferred.
' N.C. SEss. LAWS 1959, c. 646, as amended, 1963, c. 200:
No clergyman, ordained minister, priest, rabbi, or accredited
Christian Science practitioner of an established church or religious
organization shall be required to testify in any action, suit, or proceeding, concerning any information which may have been confidentially communicated to him in his professional capacity under
such circumstances that to disclose the information would violate a
sacred or moral trust, when the giving of such testimony is objected
to by the communicant; provided, that the presiding judge in any
trial may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary
to a proper administration of justice.
'"There is a limited number of statutory privileges. They are absolute
in the sense that, even in matters involving public justice, a court may not
compel disclosure of confidential communications thus made privileged."
People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 152, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565 (1955).
Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 Onio ST. L.J.
55, 78 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
6 Id.
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may properly be found where the communicant testifies "concerning what transpired at confession." 7 With regard to the other usual
methods of waiver,' it is certain that a statement by the communicant would suffice. It is less certain that a signed affidavit would
meet this test and practically indisputable that an out-of-court stipulation by the parties would be insufficient to constitute waiver.9
Second, the provision by which the judge could compel disclosure when necessary in his opinion to the proper administration of
justice was omitted from the new statute. It is likely that this provision for compulsory disclosure was originally included in the
old statute because of the similar provision in the physician-patient
privilege statute.10 There is, however, greater justification for such
a power where the privilege is primarily evoked in litigation involving life insurance policies and misrepresentations of health, corporeal injuries and their extent, and testimentary dispositions and
the issue of mental capacity.'1 In litigation involving the priest-penitent privilege there are few cases in which the "only evidence against
a defendant is his confession to a clergyman."' Moreover, doubt has
been expressed that the "existence" of the privilege is a potent factor
in the exclusion of relevant testimony since "it would be a poor priest
or clergyman that would reveal confidential confessions and an
even poorer prosecutor who would insist upon it."'" Appreciation
for the omission of this discretionary power is enhanced when one
considers that the trial judge's discretion "would be final because
the only possible ground for review would have to be whether it
'was in his opinion' and even the most ingenious logician could
'Id. at 79. Concerning the physician-patient privilege, the court, in
Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 23, 116 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1960), said that
waiver is "by implication where the patient calls the physician as a witness
and examines him as to patient's physical condition, . . . or . . . testifies
to the communication between himself and physician."
' Reese at 79.
'This conclusion follows from analysis of the provision stating that the
statute will not apply only "where communicant in open court waives the
privilege conferred." Statute cited note 2 supra. [Emphasis added].
For the physician-patient privi10 See 38 N.C.L. REv. 190, 191 (1960).
lege statute, as a means of comparison, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
" Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 38, 125 S.E.2d
326, 331 (1962). A definite "finding appearing of record," Creech v.
Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937), was necessary
to show that compulsory testimony was required by the "ends of justice," Yow
241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954).
v. Pittman,
1 27 IND. L.J. 256, 267 (1952).
" Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rides of Evidence, 26 U. Cin.
L. Rav. 537, 545 (1957).
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hardly make 'his opinion' reviewable before an appellate court."' 4
Divestment of the discretionary power gets the judge "off the
hook" in uncomfortable cases because he realizes that any decision
to compel a clergyman to testify is likely to result not only in contempt proceedings and imprisonment but also in marshalling public
opinion in the clergyman's favor.r
Third, the description of the confidential communication reflects
broadened conditions under which the privilege may be claimed.
The unswerving persuasion of the clergyman as to his professional
obligations and responsibilities " is reflected in the liberal terms in
which the new privilege statute was enacted. Any information
communicated and entrusted to him in his professional capacity
and necessary for him to discharge his official functions is to be
regarded as incompetent testimony.17 Thus it appears that the intent of the General Assembly was not to limit the communication to
a confession of sins alone, the privileged status of which would
depend upon the "confession" requirements of a particular church.18
Rather, the type of information to which the privilege extends is
explicated by the paradoxically broadening limitation that the
"person so communicating such information about himself or
another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice relative to and growing out of the information so imparted."'" However, there is no
requirement that the claimant be a member of the congregation or
church which the minister serves.20 Under this broadened coverage
it would seem that information obtained during marriage counseling
or reconciliation sessions with a clergyman would be accorded the
privilege."' It is less certain that the privilege is applicable to inReese at 76.
Reese at 60-61.
" For the attitude typical of most clergymen when faced with the dilemma
requiring a choice of either testifying or facing contempt of court proceedings, see Greensboro Daily News, June 19, 1966, § D, at 12, col. 1-8, and
lit re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 70-72, 152 S.E.2d 317, 319-321 (1967).
'"
Statute cited note 2 supra.
'8 See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931).
19 Statute cited note 2 supra.
20
Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank, 37 Misc.2d 27, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849 (New
York City Civ. Ct. 1962).
" Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc.2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The decision was under a statute similar to that of North Carolina.
Such information has been denied the privilege under a dissimilar statute
limiting "confessions" to those in the "course of discipline enjoined by the
church." Although the statute was said not to have provided the privilege
1"
1
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formation in the records of a church-related agency.2 2 While North

Carolina is avowedly a "strict constructionist"' ' of privilege statutes, the court has extended the physician-patient privilege to certain
hospital records 24 so that an analogous extension of the priest-penitent privilege would not be without precedent.
Although the new statute is instructive in regard to many previously unanswered questions about the privilege in North Caroline,
it is no panacea. At least two primary questions, for example,
were left unresolved in In re Williams,2 5 which is believed to have
had a catalytic effect on the recent statute.26
The first-and less difficult-question was whether the superior
court was correct in holding that "any testimony from [the minister] concerning any conversation he might have had with the defendant"2 7 would be recognized as a privileged communication. In
regard to this question it should be remembered that under the new
statute the communication must have reference to the giving of
spiritual counsel, aid, or advice.2 Therefore, testimony concerning
"any conversation" is too broad a classification for application of
the privilege. Casual or friendly conversation unrelated to the above
as to marriage counseling, the court managed to find a privilege in a preconference agreement with the rabbi. Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal.App.2d
90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1965).
22 State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 124 N.W.2d 355 (1963) (no allegation
of confession of unwed mother).
"' Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 37, 125, S.E.2d
326,2 331 (1962).
'Id.
269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967). This is the only case concerning
the former priest-penitent statute to reach the Supreme Court. The privilege
was raised as a collateral matter in a criminal prosecution in the superior
court when Williams, a Baptist minister called as a witness by both the
state and the defendant, refused to be sworn as a witness or to testify as
to his observations while in the home of the defendant. Upon the defendant's
objection the court ruled that testimony concerning any conversation between
the defendant and Williams, his minister, would be a privileged communication. But the defendant did not object to testimony concerning Williams'
observations and the court held Williams in contempt of court for his refusal

to answer a question concerning what he had seen. The case was dealt

with on appeal by construing the statute strictly according to the procedural
requirement of an objection by the communicant for the testimony to be
incompetent.
2 For an overview of some of the factors which brought about the
statutory change, see Finlator, "Resolution to be Presented to the Baptist

State Convention of North Carolina Meeting in Winston Salem, November
14, 1966."
22 269 N.C. at 71, 152 S.E.2d at 320. [Emphasis added].
28

See State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 N.W. 277 (1895).
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purposes cannot be said to fall within the protection of the privi29
lege.

More difficult is the complex question of whether an observation
of a clergyman incident to a privileged communication is also privileged "information" within the meaning of the statute. Generally
a statute creating a privilege against disclosure of a confidential
communication "has been construed to include observations, as well
as communications."" ° Since the statute includes "any" information, there is no reason to exclude from the definition of information those observations "communicated" to the priest in the course
of spiritual counseling. Such observations would circumscribe the
acts of the communicant, his general attitude and his personal appearance. These are necessary concomitants of the intimate faceto-face nature of counseling. At least one state has provided by
statute that clergymen are under no duty to report a communicant's
gunshot wound to law enforcement officials if such a report would
violate a confidential communication."1
This conclusion, however, does not answer the question of
whether observations concerning persons or subjects other than the
communicant are to be accorded the privilege. One may argue that
were it not for the purpose of receiving privileged information the
clergyman would not have been in a position to make such an observation. Thus it would follow that the privileged information should
include the observations which otherwise would not have been
made. The difficulty with this argument is that it has been extended
beyond its practical limitations. It is analogous in this respect to
the "but for" theory of proximate cause restrictions which do not
allow one involved in an automobile accident to be assessed with fault
merely because had he not been driving the accident would not
have occurred.
But the above argument-while invalid in its application to third
parties or subjects having no personal connection with the communicant-may well apply to those persons or things immediately in" See Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 77, 370 P.2d 788 (1962) which
held not privileged remarks during conversations in course of friendly meetings.
igSee Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822,
841, 6 N.W.2d 401, 410 (1942); cf.
Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind.App. 362, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950), where it
was held that personal observations not involving a confession enjoined by
the church are admissible (observation as to soundness of mind of grantor
of deed).
" 0HIO REv. CODE § 2917.44 (1961).
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volved with either the communicant or the communication in a
manner similar to his personal appearance. The logic of the privilege seems to require inclusion of this latter type of observation
within privileged information. If it did not, for example, the effect
of the privilege as to testimony concerning the penitent's admissions
of thefts would certainly be vitiated by subsequent testimony of the
priest that he saw the stolen goods. Thus it is clear that formulation of comprehensive rules dealing with varying factual situations
must await case by case development of more specific privilege principles.
The new statute embodies the recognition by the General Assembly that the purpose of the former statute could be better served by
broadening the terms defining the privilege. The new statute follows a trend among state legislatures to liberalize the priest-penitent
privilege32 and should be well received by the clergy and the Bar.
Such a direction clearly conforms to the basic policy underlying the
priest-privilege that
Knowledge so acquired in the performance of a spiritual
function . . . is not to be transformed into evidence to be given
to the whole world. .

.

. The benefit of preserving these confi-

dences inviolate overbalances the possible benefit of permitting
litigation to prosper at the expense of the . . . spiritual rehabili-

tation of a penitent. The rules of evidence have always been
concerned3 not only with truth but with the manner of its ascertainmenta
THOMAS W. TAYLOR
Insurance-The "Other Insurance" Clause Conflict
The controversy among the courts concerning conflicting "other
insurance" clauses 1 in automobile liability policies is no small one.
This conflict arises when two policies appear to provide general
coverage to a driver, yet each claims exclusion from liability. That
claim is generally based on provisions in each stating either that
"North Carolina was among the twelve states in which priest-penitent
statutes were enacted during the five-year period, 1957-1962. There has been
no apparent abuse of the privilege, evidenced by the fact that no state has
ever repealed its statute once it was adopted. Reese at 58.
" Mullen v. U.S., 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
1 "Other insurance" clauses are "clauses which purport to vary the coverage of the policy if there is another policy or other policies protecting the
risk insured against." Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 503 (1961).
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the policy shall not extend coverage where there is available to the
driver other valid and collectible insurance, or that the policy shall
provide coverage only for liability in excess of the limits of such
other insurance.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mitt. Ins. Co.2 Mrs. Widenhouse,
with a view toward purchasing, drove an automobile owned and
held for sale by Concord Motors, Inc. She struck and injured
David Clontz. Concord Motors held a "Garage Liability Policy"
issued by Shelby Mutual Insurance Company under which Mrs.
Widenhouse was insured as an operator with the permission of the
named insured. Mrs. Widenhouse was also covered by an owner's
liability policy with "drive other car ' 3 coverage issued to her husband by the Allstate Insurance Company. Both Mrs. Widenhouse
and Concord Motors were sued by Clontz's father as next friend.
Allstate sued Shelby Mutual for declaratory judgment concerning
the liability of the insurers. The Supreme Court held that the
garage liability policy did not cover the accident because of the
provision therein that a user such as Mrs. Widenhouse would not
be covered if other valid and collectible automobile insurance, either
primary or excess, was available to such user. The provision was
held to be controlling even though the Allstate policy contained a
provision that insurance with respect to a non-owned automobile
4
would be excess insurance over other valid and collectible insurance.
There are three principal types of "other insurance" clauses:
(1) the "escape" clause, providing that in the event of other insurance the insurer issuing the policy in question will be released from
all liability; (2) the "excess" clause, providing that in the event of
:269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
'A "drive other car" clause is one which provides that if the owner is
subjected to liability due to his casual driving of another vehicle, the insurer
will assume such liability.
'Allstate also contended that the fact that Mrs. Widenhouse was driving
a dealer-owned automobile was an event which invoked an exclusionary
provision of their policy relating to a non-owned automobile used by insured
"in the automobile business." The court denied the contention that this
was a use "inthe automobile business" on the basis of Jamestown Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
269 N.C. at 347, 152 S.E.2d at 441. The Jamestown case is North Carolina's
only previous encounter with the problem here involved. There the conflict
was between a clause excluding coverage where a non-owned car was being
used in the "automobile business" and a garage liability policy containing
an ordinary "escape" clause. Since the Court ruled that the car was not
being used in the "automobile business" and thus not within the exclusion
of the former policy, direct confrontation with the conflict was avoided.
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other insurance the coverage offered by the policy in question shall
be "excess" coverage-i.e. the insurer will be liable only if the loss
is in excess of the maximum coverage afforded by the other policy
or policies; and (3) the "pro rata" clause, providing that in the
event of other insurance the insurer issuing the policy in question
shall be liable only for the proportion of the loss that represents the
ratio between the limit of liability stated therein and the total limit
of liability in all other valid and collectible insurance covering the
loss.5 Since automobile liability policies often contain "drive other
car" clauses, and since many policies extend their coverage to motor
vehicles "used" by or on behalf of the named insured in addition
to the vehicle owned by him, it is not infrequent that a loss caused
by the operation of a motor vehicle is covered by two or more policies. As each of these policies may also have "other insurance"
clauses, the possibility for conflict becomes obvious. 6 This is especially true in North Carolina as every owner of an automobile is
required to have liability insurance coverage. Because of the potential frequency of this conflict and North Carolina's recent entry
into the controversy, it is necessary to analyze the Supreme Court's
holding in light of policyholder interests and the effective administration of justice.'
'Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 503 (1961).
Id. at 504.
Although it is difficult to generalize in this area, a few trends are
worth noting. Ordinarily conflicts arise between clauses easily classifiable
as one of the three types. In the greatest number of cases the conflict between a "no liability" or "escape" clause and an "excess" clause has been
resolved by imposing liability on the insurer issuing the "escape" policy.
However, it has been held that the conflict between these clauses is irrecon-

cilable and the insurers should be compelled to prorate the loss. Oregon

Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.
1952); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717
(7th Cir. 1941); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters, 34
Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters, 56 Ill. App.2d 224, 205 N.E.2d 735 (1965); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 37 N.E.2d 198
(1941); see generally, Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1163, 1164-67 (1956). For
treatment of conflicts between two "pro rata" clauses, see Liberty Universal
Ins. Co. v. Nat. Surety Corp., 338 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1964); Celina Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 194 Md. 236, 71 A.2d 20 (1950); Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Hunter, 341 Mass. 238, 168 N.E.2d 271 (1960); see generally,
Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 611 (1952). For treatment of conflicts between a
"no liability" clause and a "pro rata" clause, see McFarland v. Chicago
Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952); see generally, Annot., 46
A.L.R.2d 1163, 1167-68 (1956). For treatment of conflicts between an
"excess" clause and a "pro rata" clause, see Globe Indemnity Co. v. Capital
Ins. & Surety Co., 352 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1965); Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins.
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The Allstate case is a good example of the difficulty involved in
attempting to reconcile the conflicts that frequently arise. The clause
in the Allstate policy was of the ordinary "excess" type:
[T]he insurance with respect to a temporary substitute or nonowned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance.8

The clause in the Shelby Mutual "Garage Liability Policy" was
classifiable as an "escape" or "no liability" clause, but its language
varied from that normally used in such clauses:
[O]nly if no other valid and collectible automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess, with limits of liability at least
equal to the minimum limits specified by the Financial Responsibility Law of the state in which the automobile is principally
garaged, is available to such person . . . [shall this policy be
valid] .0

The usual "escape" clause does not contain the language "either
primary or excess," but merely states that if there is other valid and
collectible insurance available to the driver, the policy affords no
coverage. It is this distinction on which the Court based its conclusion that the Shelby Mutual policy did not provide coverage for
Mrs. Widenhouse. In considering the policies, the court said:
[Hi]ere, the Shelby Mutual policy is not ambiguous with reference to the intent of the parties to exclude coverage under it
where the other policy contains an "excess" clause. The Shelby
Mutual Policy expressly makes the existence of such "excess"
policy an event which sets the Shelby Mutual's exclusionary
clause into operation . . .10

The Court reasoned that since the Allstate "excess" policy invoked
the exclusionary clause of the Shelby Mutual policy, the event which
would activate the limitation or deferment clause of the Allstate
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959); Mountain States
Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 135 Mont. 475, 342 P.2d 748 (1959);
Lamb-Weston Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110
(1959); Jensen v. New Amsterdam Ins. Co., 65 Ill. App.2d 407, 213 N.E.2d
141 (1965); see generally, Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
8269 N.C. at 345, 152 S.E.2d at 439.
°269 N.C. at 344, 152 S.E.2d at 439.
110269 N.C. at 351, 152 S.E.2d at 443. Before making this statement
the court distinguished the recent Illinois decision in New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Certain Underwriters, 34 Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966) holding
that an "excess" policy was not such as would set an "escape" policy's
exclusionary clause in operation.
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policy had not occurred." In other words, the Allstate policy was
an event which triggered the Shelby Mutual "escape" limitation.
Thus the Shelby Mutual policy was no longer in existence and
could not invoke the Allstate "excess" limitation.
It is not clear why the court could not have first considered the
effect of Allstate's "excess" policy and then considered whether the
Shelby Mutual policy was such as would invoke the Allstate limitation. The court itself recognized that Allstate intended to provide initial coverage only in the event no other valid and collectible
insurance was available.'" Had the court first considered the Allstate
policy, it would have recognized that the Shelby Mutual policy would
clearly be "valid and collectible insurance". That policy would
thus be an event which would trigger the Allstate "excess" limitation. It then follows that the Allstate policy would no longer be
in existence and thus could not invoke the Shelby Mutual "escape"
limitation. Shelby Mutual would thus be liable up to the limits
of its policy. 3 The circuity of this reasoning is obvious. It is
typical of the reasoning used in other jurisdictions to hold that the
conflict between the usual type of "escape" and "excess" clauses
should be resolved in favor of the "excess" policy.14
It is questionable whether the addition of the language "either
primary or excess" is a distinction sufficient to justify the effect
11 269 N.C. at 345, 152 S.E.2d at 439.
12269 N.C. at 349, 152 S.E.2d at 442.
13 In the event the liability to Clontz exceeds the limits of the Shelby
Mutual policy Allstate will be liable for any excess. However, the concern
here is over which of the two companies must bear the burden of defending
Mrs. Widenhouse and sustain the initial liability, if any. If it could be
assumed that there will be such liability and it will be in excess of the
Shelby Mutual policy limits then there may be some logic in the court's
reasoning. Even so, such "logic" is no more than the result of a battle
of semantics, an approach which as will be seen should be rejected.
"' See, e.g., Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d
717 (7th Cir. 1942); but see Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). There is another argument which
is interesting to note. It is questionable whether the court was correct in
assuming that Allstate's "excess" clause was within the meaning and intent
of Shelby Mutual's exclusion. It is the practice of some vehicle owners,
such as large trucking concerns, to be self-insurers up to a certain amount
and to cover any liability above such amount through the purchase of excess
liability insurance. In view of Shelby Mutual's reference to "[O]ther ...
liability insurance ,either primary or excess ... ." 269 N.C. at 344, 152 S.E.
2d at 439, it is possible that it had in mind only that type of "excess"
liability insurance. In any event the rule that an insurance policy is to be
strictly construed against the insurance company could be read to require
the above interpretation of the Shelby Mutual clause.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

given it in the Allstate case.' 5 Only two other courts have considered this precise conflict.' 0 Our court rejected the Louisiana
conclusion that the policies are mutually repugnant and liability
should therefore be prorated, because it was based on the "unsound"
premise that the "escape" clause in one policy and the "excess"
clause in the other policy were "like" provisions.' 7 However, the
distinction offered by the North Carolina Supreme Court is not as
persuasive as the finding that the policies contained "like" provisions.'" In defense of its conclusion the Louisiana Court stated
that:
15 It has been the majority position in the past to hold that the ordinary
"excess" clause will prevail over the ordinary "escape" clause. See note 7
supra. The North Carolina Court has taken the opposite view in the Allstate case on the basis of additional language placed in the "escape" clause.
It will be shown that when these clauses were added the meaning and intent
of each company was indistinguishable and therefore the clauses should
have been held irreconcilable and the companies required to pro rate any
loss.
16 The Florida Court in Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.2d 367
(Fla. 1954) supported the North Carolina position. There the Court was
faced with an owner-lessor liability provision stating that the insurance
does not apply "to any liability for such loss as is covered on a primary,
contributory, excess or any other basis by insurance in another company",
and a driver-lessee liability provision providing for "excess" coverage over
any other valid and collectible insurance. Though the Court purported to
rely strongly on the case of McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d
5, 6 (7th Cir. 1952), it appears that they concluded that the former policy
should prevail without giving any conceptual justification. The Louisiana
Court of Appeals twice took the opposite view. In Lincombe v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 920 (La. App. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La.
905, 168 So.2d 820 (1964) the court was faced with a driver policy identical
to the Allstate policy in the present case and an owner policy identical to
that of Shelby Mutual. The two policies were held mutually repugnant and
the companies required to prorate. The other case, State Farm Mit. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d 750 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied,
249 La. 454, 187 So.2d 439 (1966), arose out of the same fact situation as
Lincombe and involved the identical provisions. These two Louisiana cases
would seem to be the better authority for our court since they are more
recent and most clearly present the conflict.
" 269 N.C. at 351, 152 S.E.2d at 444.
" In our opinion there is no real difference between the quoted
provisions of these policies. In each the purpose is to relieve the
insurer from all or a portion of the liability which it otherwise would
have if there is other valid and collectible insurance of the same
type available to the insured. Actually the insurance afforded by
one of these policies is not any more "available" to the insured than
is the insurance provided by the other. We think, therefore, that
the "excess insurance" clause in the State Farm policy and the
"other insurance" or escape clause in the Travelers policy are mutually repugnant to each other, and that insofar as the claim in
this case is concerned those provisions of the policies are ineffective.
Lincombe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 920, 925 (La. App.
1964).
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* . . we correctly held it was impossible to reconcile the respecive "excess" and "escape" clauses in the two policies. Indeed,
there is actually no way by logic or word-sense to reconcile two
such clauses, where each policy by itself can apply as a primary
insurer, but where the clause in each policy nevertheless attempts
to make its own liability secondary to that of any other policy
issued by a similar primary insurer. For then the primary
and (attempted) secondary liability of each policy chase the
other through infinity, something like trying to answer the
question: which came first, the chicken or the egg?19

It is evident that the resolution of this conflict depends largely on
the determination of whether such clauses are "like" or distinguishable so as to justify applying one before the other. With so few
guides such a determination should not be made without considering
the intent of the contracting parties.20
The most obvious intent of each insurer was "to make its own
liability secondary to that of any other policy issued by a similar
primary insurer." 21 The only real difference for present purposes
is that each insurance company chose a different type of "other insurance" clause to accomplish the same result. 2 By including the
extra language in its "escape" clause Shelby Mutual may well have
intended to show a specific intent to prevail over the "excess" or
any other type clause. But the purpose was still to make their insurance coverage secondary to any other insurance which might
potentially cover the loss. By engaging in a senseless battle of
semantics, the court has fostered an endless battle of terms with
each company changing its policy provisions in order to prevail
over another company doing the same. On the other hand, a rec10 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d 750,
753-54 (La. App. 1966). The quote is from Judge Tate's concurring
opinion; see that opinion at pages 754 and 755 for a very lucid and persuasive argument that the owner's insurer in this type of case should be held
primarily liable.
0An insurance policy is a contract between the parties, and the
intention of the parties is the controlling guide in its interpretation.
It is to be construed and enforced in accordance with its terms insofar
as they are not in conflict with pertinent statutes and court decisions.
Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 381, 387, 126 S.E.2d 161, 167
(1962).
1 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d 750,
754 (La. App. 1966).
" There is the minor difference that Allstate intended coverage if other
policy limits were not sufficient to cover the liability while Shelby Mutual
did not.
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ognition that these are "like" provisions calling for a sharing of
the loss will put an end to such a useless contest.
There are two alternatives to the court's repeated participation
in this battle of semantics. First, proration could be required whenever a conflict arises. The policyholder would know what to expect
and would receive all benefits of timely investigation, settlement
effort or defense and he would not have to await litigation between
the insurance companies. The insurance companies themselves
would no longer need to engage in a "battle of forms." Furthermore, the court's time and the taxpayers' money would not be
wasted on futile endeavors to reconcile the irreconcilable. It may
be that in isolated cases the outcome will be unfair to a particular
insurer, but on balance the greatest justice will be accomplished.
The second alternative is the development of principles indicating
which insurer will be held primarily liable in conflict situations. In
the Allstate case it may be that the driver's insurer should be primarily liable since his insured was the party at fault. On the
other hand, it may be that the car owner's insurer should be primarily liable since his insured was responsible for the use of the
car. It may even be that the insurers should share the loss since
each insured was partly responsible. Such a set of guiding prin23
ciples was suggested by the Pacific Claims Executives Association.
The formulation of such principles would enable insurance companies to determine accurately when they will be liable in conflict
situations. The resulting advantages would be the same as those
applying in the case of proration.24
Either of these alternatives is more desirable than the course
taken by the court in Allstate which in effect requires that the parties
await a semantic battle in the courts to resolve each new change
as it arises. Reconsideration of this conflict in light of the above
analysis and available alternatives would be to the benefit of policyholders, insurance companies and the court itself.
SAMUEL G. GRIMES
" Those principles were outlined in an article by Kenneth S. Hawkes
in the Insurance Law Journal. Hawkes, Liability Guiding Principles,
1960 INs. LAW J. 481.
24 Either of these alternatives would likely have some affect on the
rates charged by the companies for these types of coverage. However, in
view of the many variables involved a discussion of such is not within
the scope of this note. But it should be recognized that the savings to insurance companies in terms of litigation and related expenses would almost
certainly be reflected in the rates charged.
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Labor Law-Judicial Enforcement of Labor Union
Fines in State Courts
Two locals of the United Auto Workers, operating under a
union security agreement, called economic strikes against the AllisChalmers Manufacturing Company after authorization by two
thirds of the membership. Several union members refused to participate in the strikes and returned to work. Following settlement
of the strikes, the union tried these members before the proper union
tribunal on charges of conduct unbecoming a union member and
imposed fines ranging from twenty to one hundred dollars. Upon
the refusal of several members to pay, the union successfully sued
in the state court to enforce the fine. Allis-Chalmers then filed
charges with the National Labor Relations Board1 alleging that the
union's action was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1)
(A) of the Labor-Management Relation Act in that it restrained
or coerced the members in the exercise of their section 7 right3 to
"refrain" from concerted activities. On appeal the Supreme Court
held that section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits neither the imposition of
reasonable fines on full union members nor the judicial enforcement
of such fines.4
The Court, relying heavily upon legislative history, found that
section 8(b) (1) (A) was aimed mainly at organizational tactics of
unions and that it was not intended to apply to internal union affairs.
' The Board dismissed the complaint. 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964). A three
judge panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the dismissal, 34
U.S.L. WEEK 2157 (1965) (the decision has been withdrawn and will not
appear in the official reports). The Seventh Circuit on rehearing en banc
reversed (4 to 3), 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit in a 5 to 4 decision, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
'§ 8(b) (1) (A) states "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 (§ 7) of this title:" The section then
adds a proviso, "That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein ...

."

Labor Management Relations Act

§ 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964), [hereinafter cited as
Taft-Hartley].
' § 7 states "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ......
Taft-Hartley § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
' NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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This construction avoided the essential and perplexing problem
inherent in all union disciplinary cases-the conflict between the
section 8(b)(1) (A) proviso and the member's section 7 rights.'
The reliability of the legislative history of the section is, at best,
limited. Reliance must be placed exclusively upon the Senate
debates,' a notably inferior source of legislative history, due to
the fact that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not included in the original
Senate bill as it emerged from the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare,7 but was added as an amendment; and since the conference
The
committee adopted the Senate's version without change.'
available history is, at most, evidence of the intent of one half of
Congress, and that intent is unclear as evidenced by the conflicts
in testimony of the various senators regarding the scope of section
8(b) (1) (A). Remarks of Senators Taft' and Pepper' indicate
a basis from which a reasonable argument can be made establishing
that a secondary purpose of section 8(b) (1) (A) was to protect
union members from their leaders."'
In light of the brevity and internal conflict of the legislative
history argument, the majority sought to bolster its decision by
18
12
reliance on the section 8(b) (1) (A) proviso and pure policy.
r The union's right to make rules in relation to the acquisition or retention
of membership (the § 8(b)(1) (A) proviso) versus the employee's right
to participate in or refrain from concerted activity (§ 7 Rights).
8 P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS, 404-5
(1965).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), cited in 1 N.L.R.B.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT, 1947,

at 441 (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1947 Leg. Hist.].
s The report of the committee was unrevealing.
'"If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in
the past 10 years it is that more and more labor union employees have come
to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for
the right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised
by some of the labor union leaders." 93 Cong. Rec. 4023 (1947), cited in 2
Leg. Hist. 1028.
10 "This amendment is an effort to protect the workers against their own
leaders, chosen by them under their own constitution and by-laws." 93 Cong.
Rec. 4023 (1947), in 2 Leg. Hist. 1029.
" Comment, 8(b)(1)(A) Linitations Upon The Right Of A Union To
Fine Its Members, 115 U. of PA. L. Rzv. 47, 52 (1966).
12 "...
[S]uch a distinction [between court enforcement and expulsion]
would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe
punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining
facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or
to deplete its ranks." N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,

192 (1967).
1" "Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value,
the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice
except to condone the member's disobedience. Yet it is just such weak unions
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Each of these approaches is open to attacks of varying merit. The
Court's argument based on the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A),
which guarantees to unions the right to "prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. . ." is valid only when asserted against an attempt to proscribe
all fines, rather than only those judicially enforced. Simply stated,
the Court's argument is that since Congress allowed a greater coercive means (expulsion), it could not have intended to prohibit
a lesser one (fines). The rationale is sound when limited to fines
backed by expulsion since they are always less coercive than expulsion due to the fact that the member may opt out rather than
pay. But it fails completely when viewed in the context of a weak
union judicially enforcing a fine. Obviously the fine is more coercive than expulsion, otherwise the union would not find it necessary
to employ the courts to enforce it.
The Court's argument based on public policy-that weak unions,
if deprived of the power to judicially enforce fines, will either have
to condone wrongdoing or deplete their ranks-is by far its
strongest. Either of the above would greatly hamper the union in
its statutory obligation to bargain collectively and, as the Court
determined, effectively. However, although it may be beneficial to
nourish sickly unions at the expense of their members, is not this a
policy determination better left to Congress? In fact, a contrary
intent may be glossed from the Act in its allowance of free elections,' 4 resignation of members,' 5 decertification petitions,' and
prohibition of compulsory membership, absent a collective bargain7
ing agreement to the contrary..
Justice White, who concurred with the Court's decision, implicitly rejected the Court's interpretation of the legislative history
of section 8(b) (1) (A) 8 and employed the proviso to reach his
for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all
employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function."
Id. at 183-84.
" Taft-Hartley § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
" Employees have the right to refrain from union activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Taft-Hartley
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
Taft-Hartley § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
Taft-Hartley § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
2 Mr. Justice White joins the dissenters in their belief that § 8(b) (1) (A)
is broader than merely organizational tactics and therefore applies to union
discipline.
'
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Consequently, a majority of five justices rejected the

interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A) which formed the foundation for
the Court's decision. justice White and the four dissenters read
8 (b) (1) (A) as extending beyond organizational tactics onto the
sphere of internal union discipline. His opinion tenuously 20 accepts
the majority's "greater-lesser" proposition "[that] there is no
basis for thinking that Congress, having accepted expulsion as a
permissible technique to enforce a rule in derrogation of section 7
rights, nevertheless intended to bar enforcement by another method
which may be far less coercive."21
Justice White appears to err along with the majority in crystalizing the issue as one of allowance or prohibition of all fines, thereby
making the proviso argument viable. As noted above, this argument
fails when applied to judicially enforced fines since they may often
be more coercive than expulsion. Justice White's rationale, though
faulty, is more conceptually consistent with the balance of the Act
than the Court's approach which, carried to its logical conclusion,
would allow violence and coercion as long as they were employed
in internal affairs of the union rather than in organizational drives.
His approach does not foreclose the applicability of 8(b) (1) (A)
to non-organizational areas, but merely limits its application in internal union affairs by way of the proviso.
II
In light of the lack of precedent in the area of union discipline
and the dirth of legislative background, Allis-Chalmers presented
the Court with an opportunity to adopt the "result-orientated ' 2 2
a union may expel to enforce its own internal rules, even
though a particular rule limits the § 7 rights of its members and
even though expulsion to enforce it would be a clear and serious
brand of "coercion" imposed in derogation of those § 7 rights. Such
restraint and coercion Congress permitted by adding the proviso to
19 Hence,

§ 8(b) (1) (A).

388 U.S. 175, 197-98 (1967) (concurring opinion).
"' "But the Court seems unanimous in upholding the rule against
crossing picket lines during a strike and its enforceability by expulsion from membership. On this premise I think the opinion written
for the Court is the more persuasive and sensible construction of the
statute and I therefore join it, although I am doubtful about the
implications of some of its generalized statements."
Id. 2at 199. (concurring opinion).
Id. at 198. (concurring opinion).
2 Union Disciplinary Power And Section 8(b)(1)(A) Of The National
Labor Relations Act: Limitations On The Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 584, 589 (1966).
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approach which has recently gained favor with the Board23 and to
replace its traditional "means" test. The "result" approach is simply
a balancing of all the interests involved and is akin to the nexus
or balance of interests approach often applied to constitutional
problems. It appears that this approach is the only avenue to a
conceptually sound, workable body of labor law. 4
Concededly the "nexus" approach is more difficult to administer
than the traditional means test but the results should be infinitely
more satisfying from both a practical and conceptual viewpoint. It
takes into consideration five variables: (1) the permissible objective of the union as related to the furtherance of union goals;
(2) the source of union power; (3) the means used to achieve the
permissible objective; (4) the degree of invasion upon the member's rights; and (5) the right of the member to be protected from
coercion.
The initial inquiry is whether the union's objective is permissible,
and if permissible, how closely is it related to the furtherance of
work-related collective employee goals.2" The source of union power
is the next important variable in ascertaining the degree of invasion of members' rights permissible in a given situation. The
manner of acquisition of members determines the rights acquired
by the union, i.e., the union should acceed to a greater number of
rights when membership is voluntary rather than forced. An open
shop situation exemplifies voluntary surrender while a union security
shop may embody both voluntary surrender and forced grant.
The "means" must be viewed from dual perspectives: their effectiveness and exclusiveness in achieving the desired union goal and
their effect upon the rights of members-the degree of invasion.
The following commonly employed means are scaled in descending
order according to degrees of invasion: violence, court enforced
fines, expulsion, suspension, and fines enforceable by expulsion.
Violence, probably the most effective method of achieving union
goals, is always proscribed. The right to be protected is the final
variable and will usually be the employee's right to engage in or
" See Id. at 590.
"4This is the approach taken by the Labor Board in Local 138, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964), where it protected
the right of a union member to file charges against his union with impunity
from internal union fines.
" The closeness of the relationship or the necessity determines the value
of the permissible objective.
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refrain from some concerted activity. Some difficulty arises in
attempting to evaluate this right in different contexts. At present,
it appears that a member's greatest right is his access to the board,2"
while the right to file a decertificatian petition is of little value.27
Permissible Objective and Member's Right to be Protected
The Allis-Chalmers problem is perplexing because both the permissible objective and the member's right are of great value. Solidarity (the permissible objective) is crucial during a strike period,
but then so is the worker's right to make decisions which have a
marked incidence upon his individual well-being: the striker loses
his wages and possibly his job.2 8 This standoff in interests demands
that the means employed be formulated with precision to satisfy
best both interests-the greatest effectiveness with the least invasion. A deeper probing of the three remaining variables is necessary to a "result" approach to Allis-Chalmers.
Source of Union Power
The basic inquiry at this point is the voluntariness of the member's association with the union in a security shop situation. If a
man voluntarily joins the union, he is subject to its discipline. But
if his membership is a product of the security agreement, the union
may not impose its will upon him since a security agreement may
not be used for any purpose other than the collection of dues and
fees.2" Theoretically at least, voluntariness will also be a vital
factor in the litigation to collect the fines since the union's cause of
action has been traditionally based upon the contract theory. 0
Several aspects of the present security shop situation negate
voluntariness. The typical agreement states that membership is
required, as does the Taft-Hartley Act."1 The average worker, not
being an avid reader of the federal reporters, will not know that
membership has been whittled down to its "financial core."'8 2 Even
if the "financial core" option is spelled out in the contract, most
Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
See N.L.R.B. v. Mackey Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2 Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
oInternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
1
3 Taft-Hartley § 8(A)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(A)(3)
(1964).
' N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), held that
the Taft-Hartley union security clause did not permit any more than the
collection of union dues and fees.
28
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employees will not be cognizant of this fact. Assuming that the
worker has the requisite knowledge, is his decision to accept full
membership voluntary in the absence of a valid alternative? The
majority of unions assess the same dues and fees upon both the
"financial core" and the full member who enjoys all the attendant
union benefits. In effect the unions are saying to prospective members, "You must pay X dollars to us every month or lose your
job. You may choose limited membership and receive nothing for
your money, or full membership and receive a voice and a vote in
union decisions, plus any internal union benefits financed out of
dues and fees." It would be an extreme test of the elasticity of
logic to term the selection of full membership under these conditions
a voluntary choice. Board member Leedom captured the essence
of the situation in one pithy sentence: "Who can say as a verity that
a man forced to buy a cake will not eat it ?""s
Union constitutional restrictions limiting resignation also taint
the voluntariness of the continuing association between union and
members. The First Circuit has upheld a United Auto Workers
constitutional provision requiring that all resignations be submitted
by registered mail to the financial secretary of the member's local
within ten days of the end of the fiscal year."4 Membership can
not be genuinely voluntary unless the union offers dissident members a continuing, realistic choice to opt out of the union. The right
to refrain from union activities becomes illusory if unions can
judicially force obligations upon dissidents thus frozen into membership.
The Court in Allis-Chalmers concerned itself solely with the
member's present status-was he a "full member?" Motivation for
the membership was considered irrelevant. This approach allows
the coercive security agreement to be used for a purpose other than
to compel payment of union dues and fees 8 -- a clear violation of
the section 8(A) (3) proviso. 6 If judicial enforcement is to be
" General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451, 463 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
N.L.R.B. v. U.A.W., 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963).
8'Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
" Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A)
if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated
for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
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permitted, the courts must offer some protection against the misuse
of the security clause."' The union should bear the burden of
proving that the prospective member knew of his choice between
financial core and full membership and voluntarily made it. Also
the choice should be realistic-financial core members charged only
their fair share of the bargaining costs, or charged equal dues with
all other members but also receiving equal benefits which could not
be divested. 8 The only difference between the two types of membership in the latter situation would be the franchise. The courts should
also limit resignation restrictions to the barest minimum reasonable
in order to insure the continuing voluntariness of the association.
Degree of Invasion

"Where the union is strong and membership therefore valuable,
to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe
penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine.""0 The above
statement is a truism but obfuscates the real issue-whether fines
should be judicially enforcable. There has been no attempt to require unions to expel rather than fine delinquent members. This
choice is, and should be, left to the unions. A fine backed by expulsion can not be more coercive than one enforced by court action.
The individual member is in the best possible position to balance,
on a personal basis, the benefits of union membership against the
amount of the fine, and to choose the less coercive path, be it expulsion or payment of the fine.
Allowing judicial enforcement will force the member into costly
and time consuming litigation. Many employee rights will fall by
default simply because the cost of litigation is greater than the
amount of the fine." Also, the uncertainty of litigation will induce
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership...
Taft.-Hartley § 8(a)(3) 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
37 Requiring membership under the security clause and then using that
membership to impose court enforced fines upon those who are unwilling
to participate in union activities constitutes subversion of § 8(A) (3).
'The choice between the alternative types of financial core memberships
should be left to the unions since they will face the resultant bookkeeping
problems.
"N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 183 (1967).
40 "The very fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by
factional groups suggests that the lone member's rights go by default, and
many lawyers frankly admitted that they would not take a case unless it
was backed by a substantial group." Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 222 (1960).
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many members to forego their statutory protections since there is
no chance of a double loss-attorney's fees plus fine-if the member
acceeds and pays the fine.
Since the majority of state courts base their consideration of
these fines on the contract theory, their main inquiry is whether the
member's action was proscribed in the union constitution or bylaws, and whether there is substantial evidence to support the fine."1
This appellate approach taken by state courts certainly deprives
the disciplined member of the protection he deserves on the fact
finding level of the litigation. There is seldom an inquiry into
whether the membership (hence the contract) was coercive. This
should be a controlling factor in the litigation. Also, judicial enforcement would arm the unions with a great auxiliary power, the
power to force a member into submission by the threat of a large
fine. How many members whose names appear on the union rolls
will be willing to ignore the threat in the hope that they will later
be able to convince the Board or the state court that they were not
full members or that the fines were unreasonable?
The Necessity of the Means
The rationale behind section 8(A) (3) is that the union should
be allowed to contract with the employer to force non-union employees, who are deriving benefits from union representation, to
If unions are limited to
pay their share of the bargaining costs.'
enforcement by expulsion, the rationale behind section 8 (A) (3) will
be frustrated since the expelled employee will no longer have to
43
pay dues and the union will be powerless to affect his job status,
while still retaining the duty to represent him equally.44 Expulsion
in the security shop situation puts the disciplined member in a better
position than his financial core brethren in that he enjoys all the
benefits of a non-full member, i.e., equal representation, with none
of the burdens, i.e., payment of his share of the bargaining costs.
The effect of this "discipline" upon union solidarity during the
11ANNOT., 21 A.L.R.2d 1397, 1442 (1952).
"Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
" Under §§ 8(A) (3) and 8(b) (2), if a union operating under a union

security agreement expels a member for any reason other than failure to
pay dues, e.g., failure to pay a disciplinary fine, the union forfeits its right
to require that he pay dues as a condition of employment. Taft-Hartley §§
8(A) (3), 8(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(A) (3), 158(b)(2) (1964).
"Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per
curiam, 250 U.S. 892 (1955).
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crucial strike period could be catastrophic, especially in the case of
a weak union.45 The proscription of judicial enforcement of union
fines would also present a loophole for workers intent upon avoiding
their financial obligation to the union. A worker might join the
union and then intentionally violate union discipline in order to
escape the single obligation the section 8(A) (3) proviso meant to
impose upon him: financial support of his bargaining representatives.
The union would be forced to tolerate his misbehavior, which
very likely would be detrimental to solidarity, or to expel him. Undoubtedly, a member could force expulsion by a continuing calculated course of misconduct.
The evils created by the proscription of judicial enforcement in
the security shop situation are not insoluable. They may be neutralized by allowing unions to suspend delinquent members without
forfeiting their right to collect dues, 4" or by permitting unions to
demote or "expel" delinquent members to financial core statusobligated to pay their share of the bargaining costs. Title I of
the Landrum-Griffin Ac 4 7 provides adequate safeguards against
arbitrary use of these powers by the unions.
Conclusion
The means of intra-union discipline sanctioned by Allis-Chalmers,
especially in the context of a security shop agreement, allow too
great a margin for an impermissible degree of invasion of members' rights. The adoption of the proposed judicial safeguards
would make it a much closer case-to be determined by the feasibility of the alternative methods of enforcement. The relative
strength of unions and members negates the necessity of the addition
of this new weapon to the union arsenal which already includes the
proviso-secured expulsion sanction along with potent diverse modes
of informal ostracism. Proscription of judicial enforcement obviates to a great extent the necessity of inquiry as to the voluntariness
of the association since the member may opt out of the union
" Members of a strong well-established union with good internal benefits

would be more likely to pay their fines than expose themselves to loss of
those benefits. But a member of a weak union with little or no internal
benefits would likely opt for expulsion to avoid the expense of both the fine
and future dues. Therefore the weak union would have to either condone
wrong doing or suffer the loss of revenue by depleting its ranks.
4876 YALE L.J. 563, 567 (1967).
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act §§ 101-105, 29
U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1964).
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at no dollar cost to himself. Also, limiting the ultimate union
discipline to expulsion provides an internal restraint upon
unions to impose only reasonable fines, while at the same time
providing them with a real incentive to make themselves more
desirable so that members will opt to pay the fines rather than be
expelled.
WILLIAM

J.

DocmRY

Sales-Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the

Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code sales warranties have caused
several practical and theoretical problems in determining the appropriate basis of manufacturer liability in defective product cases.
The growth of non-fault liability,' either in tort or on the sales
contract, has been characterized by increasing permissiveness toward
consumer recovery against remote manufacturers. This note is
addressed to the relation between the Code scheme of recovery and
common law non-fault remedies.
The basic Code money-damages remedy' for a purchaser of
a defective product is an action on the sales contract for breach of
the seller's warranty, express or implied. The Code sales warranties correspond roughly to those developed at common law.3 Section
' See Prosser, The Assaudt Upon the Citidel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [Hereinafter cited as Prosser].
2 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711 for buyer's remedies in general.
All citations are made to the 1962 official text of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code has been adopted in forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.
Prosser termed the sales warranty "a freak hybrid born of illicit intercourse of tort and contract." The action for breach of warranty was originally on the case, a tort action, and resembled the action for deceit. Prosser
states that it was not until 1778 that an action on a contract for breach of
warranty was held to lie at all. However, once the action on the contract
was permitted, the defenses to breach of contract, principally lack of privity
and limitation of consequential damages, became entrenched in the law.
The warranty concept evolved, first through the food cases, to the point
where implied warranties were imposed by operation of the law regardless
of the seller's contractual undertaking. Liability was non-fault and in
effect tort duties were imposed on sellers. Since MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), removed the privity barrier
only with respect to negligence liability, courts invented a variety of devices,
such as fictitious agency or warranties running with the product, to circumvent the privity rules. See Prosser at 1124. However, the defense of lack
of privity to the breach of warranty action remains viable in many jurisdictions, and, further, the warranty has retained elements of both tort and
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2-313 (the express warranty) holds a seller responsible for his
representations to the buyer, section 2-314 (implied warranty of
merchantability) requires that the product be fit for any ordinary
use, and section 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness) requires fitness for any particular use of which the seller is apprised before the
sale. The warranties arise only upon a sale of goods,4 can be dis0
claimed 5 and are contractual in theory.
The Code does not require an allegation of privity between
plaintiff buyer and defendant seller/manufacturer in a breach of
warranty action. The official comment states that the overall
position of the Code is that of neutrality. 7 However, section 2-318
extends the protection of the seller's warranties horizontally to
members of the buyer's family and household, and to guests in his
home: if the buyer can maintain an action, then these persons may
also.
The Code's warranty liability is, inferentially, limited to sellers
of goods. 8 Further, section 2-715(2) (b) specifies that the buyer's
consequential damages for breach of warranty include "injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty," and section 2-719(3) states that any limitation of consequential damages "for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable." Sections 2-318, 2-715 (2) (b),
and 2-719(3) perpetuate the confusion of tort and contract remedies
which existed in the common law breach of warranty action.,
A potentially troublesome jurisprudential problem is present in
contract liability. See Comment, The Apportionment of Business Risks
Through Legal Devices, 24 CoLuM. L. REv. 335 (1924). The argument is
made that the privity requirement in warranty cases was an historical accident. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
The evolution of the privity rule is discussed in detail in Prosser. See also
43 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1965).
'See note 8 infra.
'There is an exception: a limitation of liability for personal injury is
prima facie unconscionable unless all warranties have first been disclaimed.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3).
' See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281, 309 (1961).

2-318, comment 3.
§ 2-103(1)(d); 2-106(1); 2-313(1) (a);

'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
COMMERCIAL CODE
2-315. But see UNIFOR

'UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
2-314(1);
See Fisher, Implied Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract
Hole, 11 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Matrufacturer's
Liability to Remote PurchasersFor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966). See note 3, supra.
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Code related litigation. Hawkland argues that the Code was intended to operate as a code in the civil law sense, that is, in this
context, as the only source of law governing commercial transactions.'" The principal distinction between a civil law code and
ordinary legislation is that the former pre-empts its subject area."
From Hawkland's premise it can be argued that Article II of the
Code precludes common law remedies where the basis of liability
stems from a sale transaction. 12
Hence in a typical products liability situation, where the consumer will normally have in addition to the Code remedy a paralleland often overlapping-common law tort remedy, there will always
be lurking in the background a serious jurisprudential question over
the propriety of by-passing the Code remedy, even when the Code
remedy as contrasted with the common law remedy does not afford
full and fair relief. This did not constitute a critical problem at
the time the Code was drafted,' 3 1945-1952, since, at that time,
"0Hawkland argues that the failure of the earlier uniform commercial
statutes can be attributed to their lack of pre-emption, system, and comprehension, and that this circumstance weighed heavily in the drafting of the
Code. Hawkland cites the concern of the chief architect of the Code, Karl
Llewellyn, over a (pre-Code) system of law which gave courts leeway in
selecting from among two or more alternative principals of law a principle
to settle a commercial dispute. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code"
Methodology, 1962 ILL. L. F. 291, 299 (1962).
"' "There is a wide difference between .

.

. a statute and a true code. A

'code' is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a whole
field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its subject
area save only that which the code excepts." Id. at 292. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. (Emphasis
added).
§ 1-104 provides:
This Act being a general act intended as a unified coverage of its
subject matter, no part of it shall be deemed to be impliedly repealed
by subsequent legislation if such construction can reasonably be
avoided. (Emphasis added).
See generally Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383

(1908).

1
Arguably, Article II should apply to commercial transactions analogous
to sales, such as leases and bailments. See Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 880

(1965).

1The history of the drafting of the Code is set out in Schnader, The
New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law--The Uniform
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the warranty action was with some exceptions1 4 the only non-fault
remedy open to an injured consumer. However, six years subsequent to the drafting of the Code, the first of the strict tort liability
cases was decided. 5 This created an anomaly-at the time the
Code was drafted, sections 2-318, 2-715 (2) (b) and 2-719(3) were
intended to be, and at the time represented, a liberalization of consumer remedies, yet subsequently the judicially created doctrine of
strict tort liability went far beyond the liberalities of the Code.
The strict liability doctrine is based on breach of a tort duty
running directly from the manufacturer to the consumer. The
breach occurs when an unreasonably dangerous product is placed
on the market. Liability is non-fault-it is no defense that the
manufacturer exercised all possible care in the preparation or sale
of his product. 6 It is usually held that the plaintiff has met his
Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAW. 646 (1958). A more liberal
version of § 2-318 was originally drafted in 1950. However, in 1951 it was
replaced by the present version of § 2-318. The wide divergence of state
law privily rules is usually cited as the reason for the change. See Rapson,
Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines:Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 3 UCC REPORrING SERVICE
672, 678 (1967).
" In some jurisdictions the exceptions to the principle of no non-fault
liability without privity were extensive even before the Code was drafted.
The development of exceptions to the general rule, for example, in the food
and ultra-hazardous product cases, is set out in Prosser 1103-14.
"5Prosser states that Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 80 N.W.2d 873 (1958), was the first case to apply
strict tort liability without limiting the principle to a given class of cases,
such as those involving food products intended for human consumption.
Prosser 1112.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of ToRTs § 402A (1965), provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
This section has been adopted in at least six jurisdictions by judicial
decision. See Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) ; Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) ;
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Ford
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burden by showing that (1) an unreasonably dangerous condition
existed while the product was in the manufacturer's hands, that
(2) that this defect caused the injury, while (3) the product was being used in a normal (or foreseeable) way by (4) an intended user
17
of it.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Code is not preemptive, alternative remedies can in theory apply to many claimsrelief can be granted either on the basis of breach of the Code
warranties or in tort. If this is the case then ideally definite principles should govern the decision to give relief on the basis of one
ground or the other. Indefiniteness of legal duties and remedies
in commercial transactions existed before the Code, and was to
have been corrected by the Code. This is a basic argument in favor
of pre-emption. However, in the face of alternative remedies, a
rational method of determining the appropriate basis of liability is
to look to the traditional distinctions made between contract and
tort liability: to the relation between the parties to the action, the
functions of the two actions, the interests protected by each and
the types of loss recoverable in each.
In both actions the effect of plaintiff's recovery is to shift a loss
of some kind from him to the defendant. However, the relation
between the plaintiff and the defendant which existed prior to the
tort or breach of contract is very different. Parties to a contract
have consented to deal with each other, while a tortfeasor and
his victim normally have not. Tort duties have no consensual
If the action is on the contract
basis but are imposed by law.'
the rights and duties inter se have previously been consented to by
Motor Co. v. Lonam. 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966). Comment m to § 402A
states:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions
• ..of the Uniform Commercial Code; and it is not affected by

limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by any limitation to 'buyer' and 'seller' in [the Code]. Nor is the consumer
required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable
time after it occurs, as is provided by [the Code]. The consumer's
cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with
the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected
by any disclaimer or other agreement . ..."
"7See note 16 and cases there cited. Prosser states that 22 jurisdictions
have adopted strict liability as to all products on one theory or another.
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 15 (1966).
8 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and th? Law of
Torts, 70 YALF L.J. 499 (1961).
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the contracting parties, or, as a minimum, consent to deal has been
given.' 9
The function of the two actions is also different. The breach of
contract action is treated as a device for satisfying the performance
expectation bargained for in the contract. The tort action, however, is intended to restore the plaintiff to the position he occupied
before the tort was committed-to make him whole. 0 Both actions
embody a device-the contemplation-of-the-parties rule in contract
and proximate cause in tort-which effectively reduces the defendant's liability beneath what his misfeasance has caused in fact.
While the standard is roughly the same, reasonable foreseeability,
the function of recovery in the two actions is entirely different
notwithstanding the similarity of the liability limiting rules.
A more basic distinction is in the interests protected by the two
actions. The interest traditionally protected in the contract action
is the performance of promises, on which, supposedly, the fabric of
commercial transactions rests. The interest protected by a tort
action, however, is the personal security of the plaintiff and his
property-freedom from unprivileged interference. 2 To this it
is frequently added that the tort action protects a social interest in
risk (loss) distribution over as wide a range as possible. 2
The consensual-non-consensual distinctions between the two
actions require that if the basis of the plaintiff's claim is that the
defendant did not perform his promise, then privity of contract
or some other consensual relation should exist between the plaintiff
and the defendant. Similarly, if the interest being protected is
promise performing, and/or if the perceived function of the action
is satisfaction of the bargain, then there should be either plaintiffdefendant privity or some other consensual relation. The qualification of "some other consensual relation" is added because it is
possible to conceive of situations where there is no privity of contract yet where each of the contract action distinctions can be made
"9The distinction made here is not inconsistent with the concept of duties
imposed by law on the contracting parties. The question asked is whether
the plaintiff and the defendant have, or have not, agreed to deal with each
other before the wrong complained of was committed. See L. SIMPsoN,
CONTRACTS § 3 (2d ed. 1965).
20 R. McCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
The remedy of recission an
exception
to
this
distinction.
21
L. GREEN, RATIONALE of PROXIMATE CAUSE 51 (1927).
22

E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 441 (1944).
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in favor of enforcing contract liability, for example, in a third
party beneficiary situation, or where an express warranty has been
made directly to a plaintiff not in privity.
To make a final distinction, there are different types of losses
upon which the two actions operate in a products liability context.
One of these is injury to the person of the plaintiff and to his
property; tort law has traditionally focused here. The other is
economic loss unrelated to personal injury or to injury to the
property other than the product.2 3 This loss lies in the destruction
of the value of the product-loss of the bargain-and traditionally
"The Supreme Courts of California and New Jersey decided oppositely
the question of recovery of pure economic loss in an action to enforce strict
tort liability. In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,207
A.2d 305 (1965), the plaintiff was permitted to recover the value of the
defective product from the non-privity manufacturer of the product. There
had been no personal injury or injury to property other than the product.
The New Jersey Court stated that in mass marketing transactions the
retailer is a mere conduit, while the manufacturer is the "father of the
product," and his responsibility should be no different where only economic
loss is involved. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 1,403 P.2d 145,
5 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), the California court, in dicta, stated its view that
strict tort liability should govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
The court felt that the breach of warranty action functioned better to compensate plaintiffs for loss of the commercial bargain, and that to impose strict
tort liability for all loss caused by defective products might subject the
manufacturer to liability unknown in scope. Justice Peters, in a carefully
reasoned dissent, pointed out that the majority rationale for imposing strict
tort liability in any circumstance was the theory of loss (or risk) spreading
rather than deterrance to the manufacturer, and that therefore on this
rationale there was no basis to distinguish between physical and non-physical
loss. Id. at 158.
If the rationale of strict liability is loss spreading then there is no legitimate basis for the Seeley distinction. It is often suggested that this problem
does not lend itself to legal analysis but is properly the concern of an economist. As between an ordinary plaintiff and an ordinary defendant, the
defendant's capacity to spread his loss will depend upon two factors: whether
the risk involved has sufficiently frequency of occurrence to warrant insurance
and if so whether the defendant has had the foresight to insure against it.
If the defendant has no insurance the loss will remain on him if he is found
liable. From an economist's viewpoint this is neither desirable nor undesirable since it would accomplish no gain in total utility provided plaintiff
and defendant have roughly the same incomes-the marginal utility of the
dollar amount lost is the same to both. However, if the plaintiff is insured
against the loss and the defendant not, then it is economically preferable for
the loss to remain on the plaintiff for now he can spread it. This reasoning
suggests that liability should turn, on which party is insured. The Code
partially adopts this position in § 2-510 where it is provided that a nondefaulting party in certain circumstances may, to the extent of his effective
insurance coverage, treat the risk of loss as remaining on the defaulting
party. Prosser, among others, objects to liability turning on insurance
coverage. However, if loss spreading is the only relevant question, the
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is compensible in an action on a contract. The distinction can be
illustrated by comparing the case of a machine which does not work
economic sense of the proposition is unassailable-less total utility is lost
if the party who is insured is found liable.
In the case of the manufacturer defendant, the minimum loss of total
utility is accomplished through his ability to spread the loss by raising prices
to his customers, assuming for now that this is possible. In both the case
of the ordinary defendant who is insured and the manufacturer defendant,
the result is the same, provided that the manufacturer is able to spread his
loss. In the former case the spreading is accomplished through a raise
in the insurer's premiums to all his customers. What makes loss spreading
economically preferable is the concept of diminishing marginal utility. This
posits that each additional unit of consumption has less utility than the one
which preceded it-the second Cadillac does not have as much utility as the
first. By inference, then, each previous unit of consumption has more utility
than the next one. Therefore if one unit of consumption is taken away from
ten people the loss in total utility is less than if ten units of consumption
are taken away from one person. This is because each of the first nine
units, counting back nine through one, has increasing marginal utility, while
the tenth has the least utility of all. See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNomi6s 427-30
(1964); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 527 (1961). However, an economist would quarrel
with the facile assumption that the manufacturer defendant will as a matter
of course be able to distribute his losses through price rises. See Prosser
at 1120. This assumption is implicit in identifying loss spreading as a justification for strict liability, or, as Justice Peters did in Seeley, setting up
the function of loss spreading as a barrier to distinctions between physical
and economic injury. This is not to say that Justice Peter's argument is
invalid-because there is no indication that it is more difficult for a manufacturer to distribute one type of loss than another-but rather to say that
judicial decisions to date have not taken account of relevant economic theory.
The case of the perfect competitor: the perfect competitor is defined as
one who is a mere price taker and can sell as little or as much quantity as
he desires without affecting market price or without shifting his demand
curve either to the left or to the right. The perfect competitor has no power
to raise prices. However, strict liability may result in output reduction.
According to the marginal cost theory of output, the perfect-or any othercompetitor in determining how much quantity to produce is, during the short
run, not concerned with fixed costs but rather will always push quantity to
the point that price equals marginal cost. Where price equals marginal
cost of the last unit of output no more quantity will be produced until price
or marginal cost changes. Therefore, whether strict liability will have any
effect on quantity during the short run depends upon whether the cost of
the liability are fixed-constant with quantity increments-or variable. If
the former is the case strict liability will have no effect on quantity during
the short run, and it has already been noted that the perfect competitor has
no power to raise price. However, if the cost is variable, the effect of strict
liability will be to reduce output during the short run as marginal costs will
reflect this cost. During the long run, if the cost of strict liability is variable
it will have already been included in marginal cost and is removed from
the picture, except that since less quantity is now being produced there will
probably be a slight price rise in the market. However, if the cost is fixed,
during the long run it will cause the perfect competitor to reach a new
equilibrium at a slightly lower quantity and a slightly higher price.
This brief analysis is intended as a model to illustrate that strict liability
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and thereby causes loss of profits, with the case of a machine which
blows up and kills everybody.
Applying the principles outlined here to the Code, section 2-318
can be rationalized in contract terms as each of the enumerated
classes of persons can be considered third party beneficiaries of the
buyer's contract. The section does not codify the common law test
of intent to benefit, but it is close enough to the typical third party
beneficiary situation to permit the rationalization. Consent to
deal with members of the buyer's household and guests can fairly
be attributed to the seller. The Code's real reparture from contract
theory is in sections 2-715(2) (b) and 2-719(3). The former
section specifically makes damages for personal injuries recoverable
in a breach of warranty action and the latter deprives the seller
of the power to limit or exclude liability for personal injury if he
has first not disclaimed away all warranties.
While it is settled law that personal injuries are within the
contemplation of the parties rule and recoverable in breach of
warranty,2 4 this doctrine is the result of using the warranty action
as a vehicle for imposing tort duties on the seller.25 Consequently,
with respect to personal injuries, the contemplation rule in warranty
cases has become indistinguishable from the tort standard of proximate cause. The original scope of the rule, in pure contract, was
quite different: it was intended to limit liability in the situation
where unforeseeable consequences in a commercial context result
from the non-performance of a contract term, as where, for example,
breach of a time term causes loss of profits.2 6 It is a conceptual
will not always result in immediate loss spreading through price rises. The

effect of strict liability will vary in the case of the imperfect competitor
and the monopolist from what has been outlined here. See Calabresi, Some
Thought on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). See generally Ford
Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Price v. Gatlin, 241
Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); ANNOT., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1090 (1967).
"'E.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175
N.E. 105 (1931). "IT]he law is clear that such damages for personal injury
are recoverable under an ordinary warranty." Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
25 See note 3 supra and materials there cited. See also Fisher, Implied
Warranties of Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract Hole, 11 FooD DRUG
Cosii. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 539 (1966).
" See L. SImpsoN, CoNTRAcTs 396 (2d Ed. 1965); McCormick, The
Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract,
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misapplication of the rule to hold that personal injuries are, per se,
within it. The inquiry is misdirected-if a purchaser buys a cigarette containing a cancer causing agent this does not necessarily
mean that the seller has breached his contract." If the cigarette is
otherwise of good quality and meets commercial standards the
buyer, arguably, got what he bargained for-a smoke-and an
action on the contract for breach would satisfy neither the bargain
satisfying (purpose of recovery) nor the promise performing (interest protected) rationales of the action. Whether the eventuality
of the buyer contracting cancer was within the contemplation of
the parties is irrelevant.2" Suppose, however, that the buyer was
on the verge of a nervous breakdown and needed a quick smoke
and the seller tendered delivery past the time due. If this failure of
performance causes a nervous breakdown, there is a contemplation
of the parties question, that is, whether the buyer's condition was
previously brought home to the seller. Whether a tort duty, running from manufacturer to consumer, should be imposed on the
cigarette manufacturer, and then whether this duty has been
breached, are distinct and unrelated matters. The conceptual difficulty that this analysis leads to is in saying that a personal injurycausing product can be merchantable. However, this is the result
of treating the breach of warranty as a tort.
19 MINN. L. REv. 497 (1935). Amram and Goodman, Some Problems in
the Law of Implied Warranty, 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 259, 268 (1952), are

critical of cases which "while talking in terms of contract liability for breach

of warranty have in fact imposed a tort standard of 'proximate damage.'"
Pointing to Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 5 A.2d 181
(1940), where a store owner recovered for personal injuries when a bottle
of ale exploded, they say, "Her action based on an alleged breach of

warranty that the ale was of merchantable quality, though it could hardly
be argued that personal injuries to a retail merchant were a foreseeable

consequence of a breach of this warranty which is designed to protect commercial interests." Id. at 270. See generally L. FRuMER and M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 16.01(2)
" See Note, 26 ALBANY L.

(1967).

REv. 354, 359 (1962). But see Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
" It is irrelevant where the buyer is enforcing a contract against the
seller. If, for example, the buyer purchases weed killer which works-it
kills weeds-the seller has fully performed his contract. If the weed killer
also causes the buyer to develop a rash the question is whether the seller
ought to be held liable for marketing a dangerous product, not whether the
injury was within the contemplation of the parties. The contemplation
rule remains viable, however, in contract actions, as where, for example, the
contemplation of the parties must be examined to determine whether the
seller has given a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
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Similarly, depriving the seller of the power to limit or exclude

liability for personal injuries without first disclaiming all warranties
is a departure from contract theory. While it is true that the Code
permits disclaimer of warranties, it is highly unlikely that a seller
interested in the good will or trade name value of his product will
do so in the conspicuous manner which the Code requires. Since only
non-fault liability-common law tort and Code warranty-is being
considered the public policy against limitations of negligence liability
is not present. In this context unconscionability has traditionally
been limited to two situations: where one party because of superior
bargaining power is able to impose remedy depriving limitations of
liability on the other (adhesion contracts), and where fine print, or
ambiguous or otherwise "shady" disclaimers have been used. Both
of these elements are illustrated in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
2
" where an industry wide standard form contract disclaimed all
Inc.,
implied warranties and limited the seller's liability to cost of repair of
the automobiles sold. The contract was held unconscionable. However, limitations of non-fault liability and disclaimers of warranties
have not traditionally been treated as unconscionable per se."
Apart from the theoretical problems under discussion, the perpetuation in the Code of the hybrid nature of the sales warranty
can have the effect of retarding the judicial development of other
consumer remedies. In Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 1 the first
major case construing section 2-318, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court gave restrictive effect to the section on the principle enumeratio unius est exclusio alterius. The court reasoned that since
the plaintiff, an employee of a purchaser, was not a purchaser nor
one of the classes of persons enumerated in section 2-318, "it is
not for us to legislate or by interpretation to add to legislation matters which the legislature saw fit not to include."8 2 On the ground
2 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
"See generally Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Dis4 BOSTON COL. IND. and CoM. L. REv. 285 (1963).
claimers and Warranties,
"1409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
" 409 Pa. 614, 187 A.2d 577 (1963). Three years later the Pennsylvania
court adopted § 402A of the Restatement of Torts verbatim. Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). See, for cases following Hochgertel,
Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chemical Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Driver v. F. A. Mitchell Co., 35 F.R.D. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa.
1963). Cf. Phares v. Dandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M. 90, 305 P.2d 367, 370
(1957). Note that a judicial hat hanging peg-to avoid the Hochgertel
result--exists in section 1-103 of the Code. See note 11 supra.
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that the section was too restrictive it was not enacted in California
and Utah. 3 To the argument that the official comments state the
overall neutrality of the Code on the issue of privity, the Pennsylvania court answered that the legislature did not enact the comments.
While in fairness it should be said that courts construing the Code
tend to refer to the comments, the doubtful status of the commentsthey are not law nor are they legislative history8 4-- presents a problem in jurisdictions where legislative histories may shed no light
on the legislative purpose behind section 2-318. 1 The pre-emption
argument, if it is relevant to Hochgertel, is probably neutral as to
the Hochgertel result-the fact that the Code pre-empts sales remedies does not indicate one way or another whether a court should
religiously restrict the scope of the Code remedies. What the preemption argument militates against is the total by-passing of the
Code remedies in favor of a common law remedy. 0 This argument,
" See CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART I, THE UNIFORM'
COMMERCIAL CODE 457-58 (1959-61): Comment, Implied Warranty, Strict

Tort Liability for Personal Injuries, And the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-318, 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965). In addition, non-uniform versions of
section 2-318 have been enacted in ten states. REPORT No. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 13 (1967).
This report proposes two alternative amendments for states dissatisfied with
section 2-318. Alternative B states that "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be

expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section." Alternative C states that "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any person who may be reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and is injured by
breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom
the warranty extends." The accompanying proposed amendments to the
official comments to section 2-318 state generally that the purpose of the
proposals is to extend the protection of the Code warranties consistent with
case law liberalization of the privity rules. Id. at 14.
" See E. FARNSWORTH, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 7-8 (2d ed. 1965).
In Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965), the Rhode
Island Supreme Court interpreted the official comment to section 2-318 to
mean that the legislature had left it to the courts to determine whether the
privity rules ought to be abrogated in warranty actions. This approach
seems to equate the comments with legislative history, which they are not.
" However, just as it can be asked whether the comments reflect legislative intent, it can also be asked whether the intention to pre-empt which
Hawkland attributes to the drafters was adopted by the legislature in enacting
the Code. The difference, however, is that there is statutory authority for
the pre-emption argument. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-103,
1-104. See note 11 supra.

" But see Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), and
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however, did not trouble the Pennsylvania court-three years after
Hochgertel, in Webb v. Zern,3 7 it adopted section 402A of the Restatement of Torts as a rule of law in products liability cases.
Beyond the problems so far discussed, there are other "intricacies of sales law" relevant to warranty relief which have (necessarily) been included in the Code. Principally these are the sale of
goods requirement and the notice giving requirement.
The Code requires that all defendants in breach of warranty
actions shall be sellers of goods."8 Section 2-108 defines a sale as
the "passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." A
literal application of the Code terms precludes the possibility of
successful warranty actions against the sellers of services, bailors
and lessors. While the word "seller" sometimes creeps into strict
tort liability formulations,"9 the tort liability principle is not burdened with a background of sales case law interpretation of the
words, "sale," "seller" and "goods." Further, the judicial doctrine
of strict tort liability is not circumscribed by the jurisprudential
arguments which may influence the construction of the Code.
In Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Service,40 the New
Jersey Supreme Court extended strict tort liability to the leasing
of motor vehicles. In doing so, the court made passing reference41
to the official comment to section 2-313 which states the intention of
the drafters that the Code provisions were not intended to restrict
case law application of the warranties to non-sale transactions. The
case illustrates that it is conceptually a simple matter to extend tort
liability to non-sale transactions. The word "seller" in the Code
does not have to be tortured into meaning "lessor," and the imposition of liability can be frankly made on the basis of policy.
Section 2-314 specifically provides that the serving for value
of food or drink for consumption either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. Beyond this provision, the Code leaves unresolved
the problems arising from the distinction between the sale of goods
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In both
of these cases the court felt that section 2-318 was inapplicable because strict
liability in tort was the basis for relief. These cases also ignored the preemption argument.
'7422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
fl See note 8 supra.
"It is used in SECTION 402A OF TuE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. See note

16 supra.

,45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
"The adoption of the Code post-dated the facts of the case.
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4 2 a Connectiand the sale of services. In Epstein v. Giannattasio,
cut court held that a beauty parlor treatment was a sale of services
and there could be no breach of the Code warranties.
The notice giving requirement of the Code should not prove to
be burdensome to consumer recovery for breach of the Code warranties. While the requirement of giving notice of breach within
a reasonable time is usually pointed out as one of the principle differences between tort and warranty liability, the notice giving requirement is not that much more exacting than the requirement
common to both actions of bringing suit within the time provided
by the statute of limitations. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers

Tobacco Co.,4 3 a cigarette smoker gave notice to the manufacturer

ten months after the smoker's lung was removed that he was electing
to treat the purchase of cigarettes allegedly containing cancer causing
agents as a breach of warranty. After having been persuaded that
the delayed notice did not prejudice the manufacturer, the court held
that this notice was not insufficient as a matter of law. In a nonCode case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc., 44 the California
court dispensed with the notice requirement altogether in an action
for breach of warranty where personal injury damages had been
alleged. The court held that the seller's liability was properly in
tort and therefore the sales law concept of notice had no application.
The distinction is logical. The function of giving notice in a commercial context is to permit the seller to repair whatever the breach
has caused. In a personal injury context this is impossible. However,
the Code does require notice of breach45 and where the Code warranty remedies are used to recover personal injury damages the
Greenman result cannot follow.
Section 2-725 (1) provides that an action for breach of warranty
must be brought within four years after the action has accrued.
Further, section 2-725 (2) indicates that an action accrues when the
breach occurs, upon tender of delivery of the defective product,
"regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach." The import of this section is that if an injury occurs
more than four years after tender of delivery the buyer cannot
See generally Farnsworth,
4225 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
rinplied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 653
(1957), and cases there cited; 43 N.C.L. REv. 1019 (1965).
" 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
"'27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).

" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3) (a).
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commence an action. The problem raised by this section is that
most states have tort statutes shorter than four years, which, in
view of the hybrid nature of the warranty,46 may result in interesting
categorizations of the liability which a plaintiff is seeking to enforce. There has been no pattern of repeal or modification of existing statutes of limitations upon adoption of the Code.
Conclusion
No matter how liberally the Code warranties are construed they
4
remain circumscribed by the "intricacies of the law of sales." 1
Notice, disclaimers, etc., are the children of sales law and their
parentage is a judicial bias in favor of protecting struggling nineteenth century industry vis-a-vis consumer plaintiffs. Serious
jurisprudential problems arise, furthermore, when the Code sales
law is by-passed in favor of parallel common law tort remedies. If
Hotchgertel" proves to be a prototype of judicial reasoning under
the Code, the ultimate effect of the sections under discussion may
be to retard the growth of non-fault tort remedies. Further, the
hybrid mixture of contract and tort law in the sales warranty results
in hazy, poorly reasoned conceptualizations of the basis of liability
in products liability cases.50
"'See Fisher, Implied Warrantiesof Quality-A Tort Peg in a Contract
Hole, 11 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 262 (1956); Comment, Manufacturer's
Liability to Remote Purchasers For "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract? 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966).
"'See Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 PIRAc. LAw., April 1964, at 49, 64.
" More differences flow from affixing the label "breach of contract" to
the plaintiff's action than the ones under discussion. The contract action
will not normally permit recovery for wrongful death. The contract action
may fail for uncertainty, illegality, want of consideration, or because of the
statute of frauds or the parole evidence rule, or because of infancy or discharge in bankruptcy. Different conflicts and joinder rules may apply, and
the plaintiff may only be able to bring a single action for multiple breaches.
See W. PROSSER, TORTs 641-2 (3d ed. 1964) and cases there cited. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539, 542 (D. Minn. 1964); Colonna v.
Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936).
"'409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). Frumer and Friedman have
analyzed the possible consequences of section 2-318 and conclude that it
should not prove to be restrictive. L. FRUMER and M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16.04(3) (1967).
But see Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.
L. Rzv. 281 (1961); 13 KAN. L. REv. 411 (1965); 31 BROoLyx L. REv.
367 (1965).
o [W]e hold the bottler, of a Pepsi-Cola which the non-privity
plaintiff purchased, by advertising and sales promotion addressed
to the consumer, induced her to 'Come Alive' and that she was 'in
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It has been pointed out that it is perfectly consistent to insist
on privity in contract cases and at the same time impose non-fault
tort liability in the absence of privity on the basis of other policies.5 1
Further, the existence of contractual remedies, where there is manufacturer--consumer privity, does not bar tort remedies in the case
of tortuous conduct. Prosser makes the distinction that when the
defendant's misfeasance goes beyond breaching the terms of his
contract, then the proper basis of liability is in tort. 2
It has already been noted that the inclusion of personal injuries
within the contemplation rule is the consequence of imposing seller
tort duties through the sales warranty.5 3 Sections 2-715(2) (b)
and 2-719(3) perpetuate this. The inclusion of damages for personal injury as a normal element of recovery in a contract action
and the prohibition against limitations of (non-fault) liability for
personal injury commingle two distinct legal relationships-that
between two parties to a contract and that between a tortfeasor and
his victim. If there is something to be said for conceptual clarity
in the law, these two sections do not say it. 4
The repeal of sections 2-318, 2-715(2)(b) and 2-719(3) is
suggested. Repeal of these sections would leave the privity doctrine
viable in warranty actions, would limit recovery to the loss of the
commercial bargain and would permit the seller to limit or exclude
non-fault personal injury liability. The Code warranty protection
would then be limited to implementing the traditional promise
performing and bargain satisfying rationales of the breach of
contract action. As Prosser argues and as several courts have
the Pepsi Generation.' . . . The evidence in this case was sufficient

to go to the jury on the theory implied warranty resulting from the

manner in which the Pepsi-Cola was advertised and traveled from
the bottler to the plaintiff.
Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
"Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on. "I
do," Alice hastily replied; "at least I mean what I say-that's the
same thing you know." "Not the same thing a bit I" said the Hatter.
"Why you might just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same
as 'I eat what I see' !"
LEwIs CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND.

"1See Byrd and Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43
N.C.L. REV. 906, 937 (1965).
" W. PROSsER, TORTS 641 (3d ed. 1964).
"See note 3 and materials there cited.
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-102(2) and 1-102(2) (a) state:
"UNIFORM
"Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." (Emphasis
added).
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concluded, the breach of warranty action is an unsuitable vehicle
for tort recovery. 55 Yet at the same time it remains a viable instrument for protecting the integrity of the commercial bargain and
affording relief in the case of breach.
The suggestions made presuppose the continuing rapid development of the remedy of strict tort liability and are not intended to
affect the problem of unconscionable contracts. 56
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.

"See Prosser 1127. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Ca. Rptr. 697 (1963).
" See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).

